Author: Sean Carroll

  • How Nice Should We Be to Students?

    At Crooked Timber, Ingrid Robeyns passes along an email she received from an undergraduate student she doesn’t know. It’s a list of seven essay-type questions about the work and impact of economist Amartya Sen, along the lines of “How has Sen’s thought changed traditional development?” (Tyler Cowen, playing the straight man, actually answers the questions.)

    A long discussion follows: What is the duty of professors, when it comes to answering questions from students? Heated arguments from different sides, largely for good reasons, and largely talking past each other. Students are complaining that they come to school to wrestle with great and challenging ideas, work hard and become passionate about what they’re being exposed to, only to find that professors are too busy to talk to them outside of class. Professors are shaking their heads in sympathy with the original post, amazed that a student who wasn’t even in a class with someone would feel justified in essentially asking them to do their homework for them.

    So where is the line exactly to be drawn? I don’t know, but it’s a really good question, to which we give very little systematic attention, preferring instead to let every professor work things out according to their own preferences. Professors hold a privileged role in our culture; in return for years of hard work and devotion to an esoteric academic pursuit, society gives them jobs with lifetime tenure (ultimately, one hopes) and no heavy lifting, thinking about ideas at the edge of our understanding. In return, they are asked to assist in the production and dissemination of knowledge — doing original research, teaching students, and talking to the wider public. But what is an appropriate portfolio of these very different activities?

    At the extremes, it’s not so hard. If a professor is teaching a class, there should be some time set aside for real-time interaction with the students outside of class. Traditionally these are “office hours” (a concept which, in my experience, undergraduates love and then completely forget about when they go to grad school). And at the other end, professors shouldn’t be expected to do students’ work for them. (I once got an email from a colleague, who was forwarding an inquiry from a student that he thought I’d know the answer to. Indeed I did know the answer, because I had just given that problem on a take-home exam that the student was supposed to be doing. More or less the definition of “busted.”)

    But in between the extremes it’s harder, and there are few firm guidelines. And the invention of email has lowered a great deal of barriers, for better and for worse. What emails should we answer, and in how much detail? You don’t want to be a jerk, but you do want to get work done.

    Crucially important is the relationship between the emailer and the recipient. In the original example, the fact that it was an unknown student was extremely relevant; if the student had been taking a class with the professor in which they were talking about Amartya Sen, there would have been some context to evaluate whether a straightforward answer should be given, or simply some pointers about where to look. But equally important is the form of the questions. In this case, they were so vague and essay-like that there was almost no simple answer that could have been of any use; the temptation to respond with a map to the library or instructions on how to use the internet must have been overwhelming. A good rule of thumb is: the less time it would take to respond, the more likely it is that a response will be forthcoming. And if it’s pretty clear that the original emailer has done next to no work themselves, they shouldn’t get their hopes up.

    I get a lot of email, as well as occasional phone calls and regular mail. And I’m happy to admit, I don’t answer all of them. If they are technical questions about general relativity (about which I’ve written a book, don’t forget), I generally do not answer, but rather point to some promising resource — exactly because I’ve written that book, and if I answered all the questions about GR that I get I would do nothing else. If they are inquiries from students or sincerely interested people on the street about the state of physics or cosmology or whatever, I try to respond with short but substantive answers. If, as is often the case, they are from crackpots who say “I dare you to refute my theory!”, I generally don’t take the dare. (An exception is a letter I recently received from a state prison in New York. The writer is not a crackpot himself, but is stuck in prison with another guy who is convinced that special relativity is internally inconsistent, and he would like to know how to respond. In that case, I’ll definitely answer.)

    The answering-email issue is just part of the much larger question of how much time professors should devote to students. The paradox is that what often draws students to a university — the place’s academic reputation, which rests on the research accomplishments of the faculty — can be an obstacle to fruitful interactions once they get there. Imagine how many physics students came to Caltech because of Richard Feynman. Undoubtedly they could have had some interesting interactions with him while they were here. But undergraduates would have found that he taught graduate seminars almost exclusively, while graduates would have found that he almost never took on any Ph.D. students. Too much worry and responsibility — he wouldn’t feel right giving a student a problem that he hadn’t already solved himself. While to me this seems like a scandalous abdication of duty (where would he have been if John Wheeler and others at Princeton had felt the same way?), the motivation is perfectly understandable.

    What this calculation leaves out, of course, is that it can be extremely rewarding to advise students, or more generally to help people to understand things. But that sometimes gets lost amidst the feelings of being burdened and distracted from what we’re “really” here for.

    Advising graduate students is a terrifying prospect, if you take it seriously; you’re wielding an extraordinary amount of influence over a young person’s life. Answering questions by email is a much smaller burden. But multiplied by dozens or hundreds of examples, and you can quickly get swamped. I suspect that most of us try to be reasonable, but walking the line between having individual chats with every interested person in the world and actually producing the research that made us experts in the first place is a delicate operation.

  • YK2

    I know that you’ve all booked your tickets for Chicago in August, for the big YearlyKos shindig. True, it’s not exactly like going to a physics conference; the halls will be filled with candidates trying to drum up votes, and people who use words like “netroots” unironically. But if last year’s event was any indication, there should be all sorts of fun people there, even if it’s harder to find poker tables in Chicago than in Vegas. (You have to go to the riverboats in Gary.)

    Like last year, the inimitable DarkSyde is making sure that science is well-represented, including a high-powered Science Panel. Last year the role of “bearded ScienceBlogger battling against creationism” was played by PZ Myers; this year it will be played by Ed Brayton. The role of “clean-shaven 4-star general who will talk about cosmology and the anthropic principle” was played last year by Wesley Clark; this year it will be me, except for the 4-star general part. The role of Chris Mooney will continue to be played by Chris Mooney. I’m honored to be participating, even if the commenters at Daily Kos are wishing it was my fiancee instead.

    I hope any readers who are at the event will give a shout. It will be fun to return to the old haunts, go down to 75th Street to listen to Vonski, maybe indulge at Alinea if we save our pennies. And we all know that the weather in Chicago in August is invariably pleasant and charming, so there’s really no exuse.

  • Dark Energy Fundamentalism: Simon White Lays the Smackdown

    Among the many fascinating blog posts you would get from me if I didn’t have a day job is one on “Why Everyone Loves to Hate on Particle Physicists.” I would not be in favor of the hating, but I would examine it as a sociological phenomenon. But now we have an explicit example, provided by respected astrophysicist Simon White, who has put a paper on the arXiv (apparently destined to appear in Nature, if it hasn’t already) entitled Fundamentalist physics: why Dark Energy is bad for Astronomy. Here’s the abstract:

    Astronomers carry out observations to explore the diverse processes and objects which populate our Universe. High-energy physicists carry out experiments to approach the Fundamental Theory underlying space, time and matter. Dark Energy is a unique link between them, reflecting deep aspects of the Fundamental Theory, yet apparently accessible only through astronomical observation. Large sections of the two communities have therefore converged in support of astronomical projects to constrain Dark Energy. In this essay I argue that this convergence can be damaging for astronomy. The two communities have different methodologies and different scientific cultures. By uncritically adopting the values of an alien system, astronomers risk undermining the foundations of their own current success and endangering the future vitality of their field. Dark Energy is undeniably an interesting problem to attack through astronomical observation, but it is one of many and not necessarily the one where significant progress is most likely to follow a major investment of resources.

    Simon contrasts the way that astronomers like to work — “observatory”-style instruments, aimed at addressing many problems and used by a large number of small groups — with the favored mode of particle physicists — dedicated experiments, controlled by large groups, aimed largely at a single purpose. He holds up the Hubble Space Telescope as a very successful example of the former philosophy, and WMAP as an (also quite successful) example of the latter. HST does all sorts of things, and many of its greatest contributions weren’t even imagined when it was first built; WMAP was aimed like a laser beam on a single target (the cosmic microwave background), and when it’s done everything it can on that observation it will gracefully expire.

    His real worry is that the emergence of dark energy as a deep problem introduces the danger that the particle-physics way of doing things will take over astronomy. On the one hand, trying to understand the nature of the dark energy is undoubtedly interesting and important, and might only be addressable via astronomical observations; on the other, there is some danger that we devote too much of our resources to a small number of monstrous collaborations that are all tackling that one problem, to the ultimate detriment of the agile and creative nature of traditional astronomy.

    I kind of agree, actually. More specifically, this is one of those cases where I disagree with all of the background philosophizing, but am sympathetic to the ultimate conclusions. (In contrast to the framing discussion, where I’m sympathetic to the philosophizing but disagree when it comes down to specific recommendations.) Dark energy is extremely interesting, and any little bit of info we can get about it is useful; on the other hand, there is a fairly narrow set of things that we can do to get info about it, and concentrating on doing those things to the detriment of the rest of astronomy would be a bad thing. Happily, astronomy is one of those nice fields in which it’s hard to learn about one thing without learning about something else; in particular, as the dark energy task force has recognized, the actual things that can be usefully observed in an attempt to get at dark energy will inevitably teach us many interesting things about galaxies, clusters, and large-scale structure.

    Still, it’s worthwhile not going overboard. More than one working astronomer has grumbled that the way to get funding these days is to insert “dark energy” randomly into each paragraph of one’s proposal. (Not that such grumblings make it true; scientists applying for funding love to grumble.) But the backstory of “particle physics” vs. “astrophysics” (or “every other kind of physics”) is a misleading one. It’s not primarily a matter of cultures or sociology; it’s a matter of the science questions we are trying to address. There is something about particle physics that is different from most other kinds of science — you need to spend a lot of money on big, expensive, long-term experiments to get detailed information about the questions you are trying to ask. The LHC is an expensive machine. But if you choose to spend half as much money on building an accelerator, you won’t get half the results — you’ll get nothing. It might be that the results are not worth the cost; I disagree, but that’s a worthwhile debate to have. But if you decide that this kind of science is worth doing for what it costs, then big collaborations and expensive machines are the only way to get it done. (Not, obviously, the only way to get information about particle physics; that can come from all sorts of clever smaller-scale experiments. But if you want the kind of detailed information necessary to figure out the structure of what is really going on at high energies, big accelerators are the way to go.)

    The issue for astrophysicists is not whether they want to continue to be small-scale and nimble and charming vs. giving into the particle-physics Borg. It’s what kind of questions are interesting, and how best to get at them. There is plenty of room out there for world-class astronomy of the quirky small-science type. But there’s also an increasing need for big targeted projects to answer otherwise intractable questions. Having a passionate debate about how to balance our portfolio is a good thing; casting aspersions on the sociological tendencies of our colleagues isn’t really relevant to the discussion.

    Update: Rob Knop chimes in.

    From comments: Here’s video/audio for the talk at KITP that Simon White gave last summer, on which this paper is based. (Thanks to John Edge.)

  • String Theory Cribsheet

    String Theory Cribsheet SEED has come out with it’s latest Cribsheet, this one on String Theory. The Cribsheets are very handy one-page summaries of some fascinating science issue. The latest one is pretty good; it only refers glancingly to the anthropic principle, which is a much more accurate view of the state of discussion about string theory than one would get by reading blogs. Clifford was apparently a consultant. You can see it in gif or as a pdf.

    Previous Cribsheets include:

    1. Stem Cells
    2. Climate Change
    3. Avian Flu
    4. Hybrid Cars
    5. Nuclear Power
    6. Hurricanes
    7. Extinction
    8. The Elements

    With the latest one, we seem finally to have escaped the tyrrany of the mesoscopic. I predict that the next one will involve cosmology or astrophysics. Unless they are going to count The Elements, whose origin does after all take place in the sky. Perhaps some day we will get quantum mechanics.

  • Offering

    It’s still National Poetry Month! Today we transgress the “National” by including a Canadian; this is by Sonnet L’Abbé.

    The vocabulary of desire
    is incomplete, a word is missing.

    My tongue searches
    for your body in language
    and finds you in every word.

    I thought this was a small thing, a stone
    in the palm I could offer you,
    my body in darkness a simple gift
    casual as a pebble.
    As if touching were easier than speaking,
    as if this poem did not prove you
    inside me already, as if asking
    meant I still had the power to invite.

    But you make me aware of breathing,
    of the awesome fact
    that each particle of air
    has been taken at least once
    into every lung.
    Suddenly I have no boundaries
    and to kiss you seems to drink up the sky,
    slip it from my tongue into your mouth.

    Our bodies just our hearts’ clothing,
    and I came to you so shabbily dressed.
    Maybe I thought that for one night
    I could wear your beauty through closeness
    and for a few hours believe myself
    splendidly arrayed.

    But you know all the lyrics
    to rejection.
    My body, your exquisite voice’s
    shattered glass.

    And here’s another one: Theory My Natural Brown Ass.

  • My Platform? Pain.

    John Edwards wants to simplify the way some people pay taxes. In particular, he has noticed that about 50 million Americans have very simple tax returns — so simple, that the IRS already has all of the necessary information to just go ahead and calculate their taxes for them. Obviously this won’t work for self-employed people or anyone with an interesting set of deductions, but there are plenty of people not in that category.

    So Edwards is proposing Form 1, a short form that the IRS will fill out and send to those who qualify, so that they can look over it and make sure it all seems correct. (Via Neil the Ethical Werewolf.) If so, just sign and return it and you’re done. Not only will it greatly decrease the burden both on taxpayers and the IRS, it will also benefit the millions of low-income workers who are eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit but might not realize it.

    It is, in other words, one of the most obviously good ideas to come out of a Presidential candidate in a long time. But wouldn’t you know it, readers of the National Review don’t agree.

    Basically they have a single objection, phrased in multiple ways: if we decrease the pain involved in paying taxes, people won’t mind as much. And then they won’t agitate as vociferously for tax cuts. That’s basically it. Some get overly enthusiastic and start griping about employer withholding more generally, suggesting that every taxpayer should be forced to save up money and file quarterly tax reports. That would truly drive home the pain.

    And all I want to say is: I really hope this becomes a major talking point among Republican candidates. More pain at tax time! I’m sure voters will appreciate the shrewd calculation underlying this enlightened policy. And as a benefit, since Republican voters are unenthusiastic about the current Presidential field and have already begun to long for a novelty candidate to swoop in and shake up the race, this opens the door for the perfect nominee!

    Mr. T

    If the Terminator can become governor of California, I don’t see why Clubber Lang can’t run for President. The Mr. T Doctrine is as well-thought-out as what we currently have.

  • Nuggets

    Things to gawk at on the internets:

    • Remember the String Kings? Then you’ll love the Director’s Cut, brought to you by Steven Miller.
    • Remember that the cell is like Tron? There’s a Director’s Cut of the Inner Life of a Cell video as well, with commentary and all that. (Thanks to many people for letting me know.)
    • Construct a Heptadecagon with nought but compass and straightedge! That’s a seventeen-sided polygon, for those of you keeping score at home. Wikipedia shows you how. Heptadecagon
  • What I Believe But Cannot Prove

    Each year, John Brockman’s Edge asks a collection of deep thinkers a profound question, and gives them a couple of hundred words to answer: The World Question Center. The question for 2005 was What Do You Believe Is True Even Though You Cannot Prove It? Plenty of entertaining answers, offered by people like Bruce Sterling, Ray Kurzweil, Lenny Susskind, Philip Anderson, Alison Gopnik, Paul Steinhardt, Maria Spiropulu, Simon Baron-Cohen, Alex Vilenkin, Martin Rees, Esther Dyson, Margaret Wertheim, Daniel Dennett, and a bunch more. They’ve even been collected into a book for your convenient perusal. Happily, these questions are more or less timeless, so nobody should be upset that I’m a couple of years late in offering my wisdom on this pressing issue.

    Most of the participants were polite enough to play along and answer the question in the spirit in which it was asked, although their answers often came down to “I believe the thing I’m working on right now will turn out to be correct and interesting.” But to me, there was a perfectly obvious response that almost nobody gave, although Janna Levin and Seth Lloyd came pretty close. Namely: there isn’t anything that I believe that I can prove, aside from a limited set of ultimately sterile logical tautologies. Not that there’s anything wrong with tautologies; they include, for example, all of mathematics. But they describe necessary truths; given the axioms, the conclusions follow, and we can’t imagine it being any other way. The more interesting truths, it seems to me, are the contingent ones, the features of our world that didn’t have to be that way. And I can’t prove any of them.

    The very phrasing of the question, and the way most of the participants answered it, irks me a bit, as it seems to buy into a very wrong way of thinking about science and understanding: the idea that true and reliable knowledge derives from rigorous proof, and anything less than that is dangerously uncertain. But the reality couldn’t be more different. I can’t prove that the Sun will rise tomorrow, that radioactive decays obey an exponential probability law, or that the Earth is more than 6,000 years old. But I’m as sure as I am about any empirical statement that these are true. And, most importantly, there’s nothing incomplete or unsatisfying about that. It’s the basic way in which we understand the world.

    Here is a mathematical theorem: There is no largest prime number. And here is a proof:

    Consider the list of all primes, pi, starting with p1 = 2. Suppose that there is a largest prime, p*. Then there are only a finite number of primes. Now consider the number X that we obtain by multiplying together all of the primes pi (exactly once each) from 2 to p* and adding 1 to the result. Then X is clearly larger than any of the primes pi. But it is not divisible by any of them, since dividing by any of them yields a remainder 1. Therefore X, since it has no prime factors, is prime. We have thus constructed a prime larger than p*, which is a contradiction. Therefore there is no largest prime.

    Here is a scientific belief: General relativity accurately describes gravity within the solar system. And here is the argument for it:

    GR incorporates both the relativity of locally inertial frames and the principle of equivalence, both of which have been tested to many decimal places. Einstein’s equation is the simplest possible non-trivial dynamical equation for the curvature of spacetime. GR explained a pre-existing anomaly — the precession of Mercury — and made several new predictions, from the deflection of light to gravitational redshift and time delay, which have successfully been measured. Higher-precision tests from satellites continue to constrain any possible deviations from GR. Without taking GR effects into account, the Global Positioning System would rapidly go out of whack, and by including GR it works like a charm. All of the known alternatives are more complicated than GR, or introduce new free parameters that must be finely-tuned to agree with experiment. Furthermore, we can start from the idea of massless spin-two gravitons coupled to energy and momentum, and show that the nonlinear completion of such a theory leads to Einstein’s equation. Although the theory is not successfully incorporated into a quantum-mechanical framework, quantum effects are expected to be unobservably small in present-day experiments. In particular, higher-order corrections to Einstein’s equation should naturally be suppressed by powers of the Planck scale.

    You see the difference, I hope. The mathematical proof is airtight; it’s just a matter of following the rules of logic. It is impossible for us to conceive of a world in which we grant the underlying assumptions, and yet the conclusion doesn’t hold.

    The argument in favor of believing general relativity — a scientific one, not a mathematical one — is of an utterly different character. It’s all about hypothesis testing, and accumulating better and better pieces of evidence. We throw an hypothesis out there — gravity is the curvature of spacetime, governed by Einstein’s equation — and then we try to test it or shoot it down, while simultaneously searching for alternative hypotheses. If the tests get better and better, and the search for alternatives doesn’t turn up any reasonable competitors, we gradually come to the conclusion that the hypothesis is “right.” There is no sharp bright line that we cross, at which the idea goes from being “just a theory” to being “proven correct.” Rather, maintaining skepticism about the theory goes from being “prudent caution” to being “crackpottery.”

    It is a intrinsic part of this process that the conclusion didn’t have to turn out that way, in any a priori sense. I could certainly imagine a world in which some more complicated theory like Brans-Dicke was the empirically correct theory of gravity, or perhaps even one in which Newtonian gravity was correct. Deciding between the alternatives is not a matter of proving or disproving; its a matter of accumulating evidence past the point where doubt is reasonable.

    Furthermore, even when we do believe the conclusion beyond any reasonable doubt, we still understand that it’s an approximation, likely (or certain) to break down somewhere. There could very well be some very weakly-coupled field that we haven’t yet detected, that acts to slightly alter the true behavior of gravity from what Einstein predicted. And there is certainly something going on when we get down to quantum scales; nobody believes that GR is really the final word on gravity. But none of that changes the essential truth that GR is “right” in a certain well-defined regime. When we do hit upon an even better understanding, the current one will be understood as a limiting case of the more comprehensive picture.

    “Proof” has an interesting and useful meaning, in the context of logical demonstration. But it only gives us access to an infinitesimal fraction of the things we can reasonably believe. Philosophers have gone over this ground pretty thoroughly, and arrived at a sensible solution. The young Wittgenstein would not admit to Bertrand Russell that there was not a rhinoceros in the room, because he couldn’t be absolutely sure (in the sense of logical proof) that his senses weren’t tricking him. But the later Wittgenstein understood that taking such a purist stance renders the notion of “to know” (or “to believe”) completely useless. If logical proof were required, we would only believe logical truths — and even then the proofs might contain errors. But in the real world it makes perfect sense to believe much more than that. So we take “I believe x” to mean, not “I can prove x is the case,” but “it would be unreasonable to doubt x.”

    The search for certainty in empirical knowledge is a chimera. I could always be a brain in a vat, or teased by an evil demon, or simply an AI program running on somebody else’s computer — fed consistently misleading “sense data” that led me to incorrect conclusions about the true nature of reality. Or, to put a more modern spin on things, I could be a Boltzmann Brain — a thermal fluctuation, born spontaneously out of a thermal bath with convincing (but thoroughly incorrect) memories of the past. But — here is the punchline — it makes no sense to act as if any of those is the case. By “makes no sense” we don’t mean “can’t possibly be true,” because any one of those certainly could be true. Instead, we mean that it’s a cognitive dead end. Maybe you are a brain in a vat. What are you going to do about it? You could try to live your life in a state of rigorous epistemological skepticism, but I guarantee that you will fail. You have to believe something, and you have to act in some way, even if your belief is that we have no reliable empirical knowledge about the world and your action is to never climb out of bed. On the other hand, putting aside the various solipsistic scenarios and deciding to take the evidence of our senses (more or less) at face value does lead somewhere; we can make sense of the world, act within it and see it respond in accordance with our understanding. That’s both the best we can hope for, and what the world does as a matter of fact grant us; that’s why science works!

    It can sound a little fuzzy, with this notion of “reasonable” having sneaked into our definition of belief, where we might prefer to stand on some rock-solid metaphysical foundations. But the world is a fuzzy place. Although I cannot prove that I am not a brain in a vat, it is unreasonable for me to take the possibility seriously — I don’t gain anything by it, and it doesn’t help me make sense of the world. Similarly, I can’t prove that the early universe was in a hot, dense state billions of years ago, nor that human beings evolved from precursor species under the pressures of natural selection. But it would be unreasonable for me to doubt it; those beliefs add significantly to my understanding of the universe, accord with massive piles of evidence, and contribute substantially to the coherence of my overall worldview.

    At least, that’s what I believe, although I can’t prove it.

  • Scientists Talking to the Public

    There’s a sprawling blog conversation going on at ScienceBlogs and elsewhere, sparked by an article by Matthew Nisbet and Chris Mooney in Science magazine. Ironically, as I’m not the first to point out, it’s only available to subscribers (although there is a press release). The origin of the irony is that the subject of the article is how scientists should talk to the general public. In particular, Nisbet and Mooney focus on “framing” — putting whatever you want to talk about into a context that strikes an appropriate chord in your audience.

    Much back-and-forth — see long posts by coturnix, Orac, and Nisbet to get some of the flavor — without reaching a simple consensus. Shocking, I know. But, despite the noise along the way, these conversations really to help make progress.

    My view on these issues is incredibly complex and well-thought-out, but sadly the margin of this blog post is too narrow to contain it. Instead I’ll just highlight something that is probably obvious: a big reason for the disagreements is the attempt to find a set of blanket principles governing a widely diverse and highly idiosyncratic set of circumstances. Talking to the public involves a tremendous array of competing pressures, and how best to balance them will certainly depend on the specifics of the situation. Are scientists bad communicators, when they are talking to the public? Very often, yes. Is it important to be better? Absolutely, both for altruistic and self-interested reasons. Should they compromise telling the truth in order to win people over? No. Does making an effort to engage people on their own level necessarily mean that the truth must be compromised? No. Should they expect the same kind of arguments to work with the public as work with their colleagues? No. Are the standards of acceptable levels of precision and detail different when talking to specialists and non-specialists? Of course. Is connecting to people’s pre-conceived notions, and using them to your advantage as a communicator, somehow unsavory? No. Should we pander to beliefs that we think are false? Certainly not. Etc., etc.; every situation is going to be different.

    But, in the absence of any actually helpful suggestions, I will take the opportunity to point to this recent post by Charlie Petit in the (awesome in its own right) Knight Science Journalism Tracker. The punchline: science journalism in the United States is in the midst of a catastrophic downsizing. In the wake of the news that Mike Lafferty of the Columbus Dispatch has accepted a buyout, Petit mentions other periodicals that have recently decimated their science coverage, including Time, Newsday, and the Dallas Morning News (I’ll add the LA Times to that list). Science sections have dropped from 95 less than twenty years ago to around 40 today.

    I’m just saying.

  • O grim-look’d night! O night with hue so black!

    All sorts of holidays going on, between Easter, Passover, and most importantly National Poetry Month, as hilzoy keeps reminding us. In celebration, here is an excerpt from the works of the immortal Bard; in particular, “A tedious brief scene of young Pyramus And his love Thisbe; very tragical mirth,” from A Midsummer Night’s Dream (Act 5, Scene 1).