Here is the video from my debate with William Lane Craig at the 2014 Greer-Heard Forum. Enough talking from me, now folks can enjoy for themselves. First is the main debate and Q&A:
"God & Cosmology" - 2014 Greer-Heard Forum
It took a while for the Saturday talks by Maudlin, Collins, Rosenberg, and Sinclair to appear on line, but I’ve posted them here.
Aaron.
“However, because I don’t find it conceivable that the quantum vacuum or field(s) (which are governed by a rich set of mathematical laws) can just exist eternally with no explanation at all, I’m inclined to believe that something brought those “things” into existence.”
That is my problem with that line of reasoning. If, as Dawkins and others have argued, appealing to god as an explanation for the existence of the universe explains nothing because god remains unexplained, then surely appealing to a quantum vacuum or field as the end of the explanatory or causal chain is subject to exactly the same caveat?
@ tristan
I agree. So, one is either intellectually satisfied that the Quantum Vacuum (or whatever eternal force/law/condition) exists without an explanation, or that God exists without an explanation. It all comes down to your philosophical presupposition (everyone has one:)
God has always been defined as the uncaused cause, even before cosmology was a thing. So it’s not a stretch (for me) to continue to place God in this regard. The atheist simple holds to and endless regress of past physical events, or they elevate some quantum state to the place of God. Both options are reasonable, but IMO the fine-tuning, moral objectivity, and consciousness tip the scale just enough to make the God option MORE reasonable (for me).
I totally get why people don’t like that God is defined the way he is (i.e., ” the end of the explanatory or causal chain”). But that’s been the very definition of God since the concept of God appeared. It’s not like theists studied cosmology and redefined God to fit what they saw.
@jack spell You suggested that my claim that your statement was merely an assertion was false – I think because you say you provided arguments. Sorry, but I didn’t see anything in your arguments that provided a basis for your assertion. I’m sorry I can’t spend longer looking at your response. I’m a bit pushed for time and there is a lot there. What I would say is that speculating about the ways an omnipotent, omniscient, disembodied mind can operate outside time and space seems a little presumptive. If we had any hints that disembodied mind(s) existed then the speculations might be more firmly grounded.
Jack Spell,
Your position here about the cause of the universe being a free willed agent, like Dr. Craig’s on the same subject, acts as a perfect exampleof the useless manner in which God and the supernatural are offered as “explanations.” A point hammered on, I think, very effectively by Prof. Carroll in the debate. (Note, as Prof. Carroll says, it’s not that a Creator God couldn’t in principle be a fruitful explanation; it’s just that no one has yet employed the concept of God or the supernatural in a truly explanatory, fruitful, useful manner).
Imagine I walk into physics labs around the world and start pontificating that I have an “explanation” for the current mysteries scientists are working on solving. My explanation is an entity, a type of particle called a “Blark.” Let’s say physicists admit “We don’t yet have a fully satisfactory answer as to why is the distant universe so homogeneous, when the Big Bang theory seems to predict larger measurable anisotropies of the night sky than those observed”
I say: “Well, too bad for you. I have an answer: That homogeneity is caused by my “Blark” particle.” The scientists ask “Really, why is that a plausible explanation? In other words: how exactly does the Blark do this, how would that work, and give us some novel insight that your explanation would predict us to find so we can attribute some confidence to your hypothesis.” My answer: “You are asking for a naive mechanistic explanation. My answer is: magic. The Blark simply has the magical attribute of ‘causing the homogeneity in the universe that you observe. Hence, I have “accounted” for the homogeneity were you and your naive empirical, mechanistic method have not. While this dilemma is fatal for naturalism, it is no dilemma at all for Magic Blarkism!.”
Clearly my “explanation” would be vacuous and offer nothing fruitful to our knowledge of these mysteries. Why? All I’ve done is asserted a possible entity, and given it the attribute of “causing the phenomenon in question.” Without actually giving plausibility to that particular entity, or explaining HOW it does or could cause the phenomon. And this has been the character of “God/supernatural” explanations throughout much of history. People have seen phenomena to explain, but have simply posited “an entity that has the power to cause the phenomenon” – strong wind blew down our hut. What caused it? Make up an entity – a spirit, an angel, devil, God etc – attributed to it the power to “cause winds” and “there, I’ve explained that!”
Science has progressed our knowledge by, in part, recognizing what fruitful explanations actually look like, and conversely what unhelpful “explanations” look like. Dr. Carroll rejects the type of explanations you and Craig give because he recognizes how vacuous they are. It doesn’t matter what label you put on them “metaphysical, supernatural, religious”…what matters is that an analysis of the character of such explanations show them to be vacuous, and unhelpful in actually understanding and predicting our experience. The types of models Prof. Carroll often appeals to aren’t just made out of whimsy: a good physics model at least starts as plausible inferences from, or are shown as consequences of, what we DO seem to know about “how the physics works” thus far.
So let’s go back to what you are offering as an “account” or “explanation” for the cause of the universe. (And let’s for the moment grant the universe had a cause):
Jack Spell: “While this dilemma is fatal for naturalism, it is no dilemma at all for theism. The contrast here is due to the fact that theism has at its disposal the explanatory resource of “agent causation.” You see, the only way in which a temporal effect could originate from an eternal, changeless cause would seem to be if the cause is a personal agent who eternally chooses to create an effect in time. A changeless, mechanically operating cause would produce either an immemorial effect or none at all; but an agent endowed with free will can have an eternal determination to operate causally at a (first) moment of time and thereby to produce a temporally first effect. Therefore, the universe is plausibly regarded to be the product of a Personal Creator, who I happen to call “God.”
Really? How? H-O-W…exactly…would that work? Because at this point all you have done is given your cause the “attribute of being able to do the thing I want to explain” and simply labelling this attribute “free willed choice.” Putting a label on it isn’t explaining how it would actually work. If you have no answer to this, if all you can fall back on is essentially “I don’t know…it’s God, the supernatural…not a mechanistic explanation so I don’t have to explain HOW such free willed action works” then all you’ve done is granted yourself the “get out of explanation by magic card.” Not only have you offered a vacuous “explanation,” you can not special plead away any other explanation that makes the same move. My “Blark” is a non-sentient, non-personal particle and it caused the universe. Hence my Blark is not some other version of your agential God. But it caused the universe nonetheless. How could it have been outside of time and produced a temporal universe with a beginning? Don’t ask me. Magic I guess. It simply “has the attribute of being able to cause universes like ours, and did.” As soon as you explain how your God and his Free Will work, that it’s not simply a magic band-aid over what you can’t actually explain, I’ll explain how my Blark works. Until then, your explanation is a vacuous as any other playing the “magic/supernatural” card.
Vaal.
** (And, btw, I’ve seen W.L. Craig’s pretty weak attempt to follow up on this by claiming he can appeal to the phenomenon of Libertarian Free Will because…hey…WE, as free willed agents have that power! But that’s not an answer. It’s just moving the same question (and begging it), sending that same unfounded attribution of magic to us. He’d first have to establish we have this magic power and/or explain how it would work, the same burden he would have for God. And I’ve seen no such answer from Craig, only an assumption we have this power).
What is this dillema of free will vs. determinism, that was presented in one of the questions? Isn’t free will related just to the place where the control resides (inside a person, or outside of a person), rather than if the control algorithm is deterministic or has some randomness inside?
Eg. if we have a person that works according to a totally deterministic algorithm, like always choosing blue over red, or always choosing fish over meat; then if we present him with such choice, and this decision will be made inside his head – choosing blue – we would still consider such choice a free-will, freely choosing blue. If on the other hand such guy has a wife, we ask him what color he chooses, he looks slavishly and with fear in his eyes at his wife, waiting for an answer, she says blue, he repeats blue – we may not consider such person having a free will.
Even a Machiavelian leader, a political “player” type, can work according to some deterministic algorithm. Unlike in the previous example such politician’s algorithm would be very complicated. And well hidden. Difficult or even impossible to reverse-engeneer for an external person. Thus it may look like a non-deterministic to the rest of the world. And in this case people agree that a ruler has a free will.
Vaal: “Clearly my “explanation” would be vacuous and offer nothing fruitful to our knowledge of these mysteries. Why? All I’ve done is asserted a possible entity, and given it the attribute of “causing the phenomenon in question.””
Isn’t your example quite analogous to the positing of a multiverse to explain fine-tuning?
Augustine1938,
“Isn’t your example quite analogous to the positing of a multiverse to explain fine-tuning?”
No.
That’s why I’d written “a good physics model at least starts as plausible inferences from, or are shown as consequences of, what we DO seem to know about “how the physics works” thus far.”
As Prof. Carroll has been at pains to point out over and over, people in his specialty aren’t just positing a multiverse on sheer whimsy (or secular desperation to avoid God) as an explanation. The multiverse hypotheses derive from other currently working models in physics, e.g quantum mechanics etc. They are one of the *consequences* that follow from the math already used to understand and describe the universe as we know it. So the models derive from the reality we know, making them plausible, vs simply conjuring up mere “logically possible” explanations.
Scientists seek to start with such plausibility in getting a hypothesis off the ground. A “how would it work?” model. (It’s not an absolutely necessary quality, as one could in principle posit wholly new processes unrelated to those we know, but that model would have to have great explanatory scope and power, make predictions, etc).**
Religious, theistic “explanations” continually fail this criteria. They posit entities that can do the thing required, but never explain or model “how” in any substantive way. Positing entities that explain “anything” this way are, science has learned long ago, a liability, epistemological quicksand from which nothing moves further, but theism mistakes this non-falsifiability and explain-anything quality for a strength. Which is why theism wallows in the fringes never actually contributing or advancing our knowledge of nature, the universe (or reality, I would say).
Again, if someone is going to say “I can get around the problem of how the cause of the universe was eternal, yet produced a temporal effect with a beginning. It was an eternal mind that had the power I call Libertarian Free Willed Choice. What is Free Willed Choice? Well, it’s attribute, the power, that allows this entity to be eternal while creating temporal effects!”
Uh. Yeah. Thanks. Very informative.
I’m going to ask “Ok, how?” To answer “free will” is only to provide a label for the thing that is missing: the explanation for what exactly it is and how it plausibly operates. If the theist allows himself to say “ok, look, this isn’t a materialist, mechanistic explanation, it’s supernatural, it just HAS the attribute I say it does” then not only has he produced a vacuous claim I can dismiss; he has no grounds for disallowing any similar magic move for competing explanations, where I can attribute to different entities the power to explain the universe…but I don’t have to say “how” because it’s not a mechanistic claim, it’s magic. Supernatural. And equally vacuous.
There really IS a reason why our most rigorous method of investigating reality, science, has been by far the most prodigious method of getting results. Science can be seen as our most successful answer to the question “how do we most fruitfully go about choosing our explanations?”
Vaal
Vaal & Jack Spell: Vaal, note that WLC’s creator must, by creed, be omnipotent. (Otherwise—fire and brimstone!) You can’t ask for an “How exactly?” explanation of an omnipotent entity. He can, therfore there it is. Here is the history of the omnipotence invention, long long ago. It’s a true story, I swear, though somewhat decorated.
When I was about ten I asked an uncle of mine, Uncle Ya’acov, who had a reputation of being knowledgeable about things, to explain to me how a radio works. Uncle Ya’acov probably had only a scant idea of how a radio really works, but I guess he didn’t want to disappoint me or to tarnish his reputation. Besides, he probably thought that playing an innocent joke on a too-inquisitive kid can do no harm. So he said: “How a radio works? Oh! that’s quite simple! Inside the radio there’s an elf who does all that talking.”
Those were times when a radio box was the size of a microwave oven, and even a giant elf could fit in. These were also times when absolute liability litigation had not yet been invented, and a small child could easily, without any tool, remove the back cover of a radio to stare at the vacuum tube enchanting red lights shining through layers of dust and cobweb, and feel the warmth and smell of that mystery chamber. I had quite an experience with this mischief, so, ten years old or not, I couldn’t buy Uncle’s answer. “I’ve seen what’s inside the radio but I haven’t seen any elf!” I retorted.
Uncle looked surprised and amused. Now it became a matter of honor, and of defending the social order—adult uncles must prevail over kid nephews. “He is very shy, this elf,” he said, “the minute you look at him he goes hiding.”
“But were can he hide; and how can he hide and still carry on with his job?” I said.
At this point Uncle decided to change strategy and deepen the mystery, get more supernatural: “Maybe you’re right, maybe that’s not what he does. But you learned in [religious] school about all those angels who can see but cannot be seen…”
“Of course,” I said.
“That’s it, that’s what he does! The minute you look at him he goes unobservable.”
To this I could find no objection. This was a well established phenomenon that even Teacher at school agreed with. [And it’s not as preposterous a suggestion as it sounds; after all, quantum wave functions do the same, don’t they?] But there were many other vexing problems with Uncles’ explanation, for instance: “There’s also lots of singing coming from the radio!”
Now the exchange got heated: “This elf is very gifted, he can talk and sing as well,” said Ya’acov.
“But sometimes it’s a man singing and sometimes it’s a woman!”
“You see, he’s a great mocking artist; he can sing like anybody. He can mock all known singers.”
“Can he imitate a choir? I sometimes hear choirs.”
“Of course he can do choirs, he can do ’most anything, he is vehhhhery talented indeed, this elf.”
Incredulously I said: “What about violins and pianos and trumpets and full orchestras and all the sound effects I hear in radio plays? You mean he can do them too?”
“Oh, dear,” Uncle Ya’acov was evidently at the end of his patience, “it’s time to stop this nonsense. I tell you this elf is downright ingenious, the smartest elf possible. Anything you might ask me about him, I assure you right now, he can imitate it, so enough with silly questions.”
“And besides,” he added, amusedly: “how else can a radio possibly work?”
Uncle Ya’acov had just invented the Omnipotent Imitator theory of radio-on-Earth, a theory that can never fail to explain any sound coming out of the radio, and—properly phrased—is the simplest of all possible theories, is it not?
The end of this story was that I did what my child’s primitive-brain religion module unconsciously led me to. I found in my cousins’ toybox a 2-inch-tall painted-rubber Mickey Mouse that looked as delivering an oration. I opened the back cover of the radio and placed Mickey in front of the transformer, which served as a broadcasting studio desk. Then I invited my seven years old brother to the radio: “Yudah, come quick, d’ya wanna see how the radio works?” Unknowingly I replayed the primeval evolutionary emergence of shamanist religion.
=========================================================
P.S.: Incidentally, science has still some remnants from the “entities” era—explanations that sound very much like “an entity that has the power to cause the phenomenon.” For instance, instead of mending or replacing GR, which they obviously can’t afford, scientists have invented dark matter and dark energy to account for anomalies. It’s probably an anthropological thing.
DEL,
1. Positing an omnipotent entity to “explain” how X occurred is no better than simply positing an entity who “had the power to do X…without explanation.” It’s just another flavor of the same inert mode of explanation.
However that doesn’t come into play here because:
2. We are discussing the inferences from the Cosmological Argument, not the Ontological Argument or Revelation. It’s an inference/evidenced-based argument and the theist doesn’t get to make the move from “something caused the universe” to “the cause was omnipotent.” That’s not a defensible move which is why they do not try it in the Cosmological Argument. Instead they try to argue toward a cause that has qualities suggestive of, or consonant with, a God. In Craig’s words: “The only way for the cause to be timeless and for it’s effect to begin a finite time ago [beginning of our universe] is for the cause to be a Personal Agent, endowed with Freedom Of The Will.” Hence he is adducing the magical power of Free Will, not omnipotence.
3. Just to riff a bit more on the Cosmological Argument: Various sneaky moves are made by Craig and his ilk as they try to imbue the mysterious “cause” of the universe with further attributes of their God. This includes propounding that the cause must have been “enormously powerful” (Well, gee, Gawd is enormously powerful, look the cause is looking more and more like our Gawd!).
Except this is an entirely gratuitous inference. There is neither logical nor practical necessity for the cause to have been enormously powerful at all. After all, where would such an inference be based except upon our current experience and knowledge of the world? The thing is, if science has taught us anything it’s that large, complex amazing effects can come from extremely teeny, humble beginnings. Trace the causes of virtually anything and you typically keep getting down to simpler and simpler causes in the chain. That’s not only the case in physics, chemistry, you name it, but as we know biology, evolution, provides a premier example. People used to look at the WHOLE of an organism and wonder “how could this all have occurred at once, just like that?” They would look at the whole of biology, the way life forms seem locked in such incredibly complex ecosystems, and wonder the same thing “how could this ALL have occurred just so?” Only a Supremely Intelligent and Powerful Creator could have created ALL THAT COMPLEXITY.
The error, as we know now, was in presuming it all arose at once. Now we understand the vast complexity and interlocking dependance of life on earth arose from much smaller, simpler beginnings; by an initially simple *process* that produces cascading results that expand in complexity. Theists are making a similar error in looking at the Universe as a whole and inferring “wow, something Massively Powerful and Super Intelligent must have Created ALL THIS!” Since the arrow of causal explanation in science typically (if not always) points from complex effects toward their smaller, simpler causes, if we are allowing ourselves to draw inferences from empirical experience (as the theist is doing here) then the implication is much more in the direction of the universe having a humbler, simpler cause, not an “enormously powerful” cause, much less an intelligent one.
(I know you know this, but for the theists arguing here…)
Cheers,
Vaal.
Prof. Carroll,
I just wanted to thank you very much for your part in that superb debate with W.L. Craig. I was one of the all too many faceless folk shoving out advice on how to debate Craig (on Jerry Coyne’s site, in this case). Thank you for ignoring us! I think your strategy turned out to be terrific. You brought a theme to the debate that was important and educational for anyone to hear, whatever “side” they were on, concerning the nature of useful explanations. It was not only a successful message, it turned out to be a successful debate strategy in undermining Craig’s metaphysical/theistic assertions, thus “winning the debate” as well.
A win-win!
Each time I listen to your talks I have the wonderful sensation of learning something!
Cheers,
Vaal
Vaal: “Positing entities that explain “anything” this way are, science has learned long ago, a liability, epistemological quicksand from which nothing moves further, but theism mistakes this non-falsifiability and explain-anything quality for a strength. ”
Well, I agree that theism and libertarian free will are non-falsifiable (they are simply made more or less likely by the available evidence, as a form of “inference to the best explanation”), but if falsifiability is the criterion for truth, is the multiverse falsifiable?
Vaal: “Science can be seen as our most successful answer to the question “how do we most fruitfully go about choosing our explanations?”
Yes, science is the best way of pursuing explanations within its purview–i.e., the constraints of methodological naturalism. But to insist that science is the ONLY way to an explanation seems to me to be like the drunk who lost his keys and insists on looking only around the lamppost because “the light is better over here.” How could the scientific method itself be used to establish the “meta”-view that “the scientific method is the only method to choose our explanations?” It seems self-referentially incoherent.
Augustine1938,
I have not suggested that the scientific method is the basis for justifying the scientific method. Rather, the scientific method is the *end result* of an epistemological inquiry into how we can justify our claims about the world of our experience.
People keep imagining that science is what one does in a lab wearing a lab-coat, and as if it were some set of rules that are “ok when you are doing science, but easily discarded when one isn’t playing the game of science…we can use new rules over here…as in my religion.”
But that’s not the case. The justifications for the scientific method arise from the most fundamental epistemological problems for knowledge, for understanding reality as we are experiencing it. We experience an onslaught of impressions, but how do we attribute “causation” and “effect” and how can we go about understanding and predicting our experiences (i.e. how can we develop “explanations” for “how” something causes it’s effect). It doesn’t matter whether you label an experience “spiritual” or “supernatural” or “immaterial” or “material” or “natural.” Whatever you call it, if you experience “A” as occurring after, or in the presence of “B” and wish to attribute A as the effect of B, then you have a problem once “C” comes along and you ALSO experience “A” as an apparent result. Thus if you experience apparent effect “A”
you now have a problem if you want to say “it must be due to B” because that is to ignore that C also could be causing the effect A. You can assert “it must be due to B” but…is that confidence warranted, absent any other way of justifying it wasn’t due to C? No.
This problem of “variables” is a fundamental problem of our experience, no matter what our experience may be ultimately comprised of. You have to start coming up with ways of justifying confidence in identifying one cause over another as causing the effect in question. (When you follow the epistemological moves up the line, you get to the justifications for why science tries to control and account for variables when preferring one explanation over another). A similar issue arises IMMEDIATELY if you want to try to uncover, or explain HOW B causes A. Because in coming up with an explanation, the logical space of possibilities is limited only by your imagination.
You can come up with one logically coherent explanation for how B causes A, but then I can come up with one as well, that is entirely in opposition to yours. This problem of “variables” in our explanations ALSO needs an answer. If two (or more) explanations are compatible with the phenomenon, how can we assign more confidence to one explanation over the other? And from these fundamental problems arise certain virtuous epistemological moves to warrant confidence in one explanation over another, moves in the direction that eventually get you science – e.g. preferring parsimonious explanations, explanations that allow novel predictions and hence which seem to deliver “new knowledge” etc. It’s our best, most rigorous and productive answer to “how do you know that?”
And you can’t just posit something else, e.g. religion, as “another way of knowing” without having to answer the same fundamental questions that have lead to the development of science. “How do you know that? What warrants your confidence in your explanation over this other explanation?” Unfortunately, theism has consistantly failed as an explanatory frame work.
It’s not because the scientific method is “assumed” as the standard; it’s that
when you take a deeper “meta” look at the fundamental epistemic problems that must be addressed, religious explanations are not “epistemologically responsible” answers to these questions. Science is our most epistemologically responsible method of inquiry into explaining our experience.
Regarding falsifiability and the multiverse, I’m in no position to pontificate with technical detail about how exactly those hypotheses are vetted. Someone like Prof. Carroll is clearly in a better position to answer such questions. However, he and others in his field have explained that multiverse hypotheses derive from the very physics (including QM) used to explain and predict the way the universe seems to operate. Hence they are NOT in the category of “making up an entity that simply has the power to do X.” Rather, they explain HOW X could occur. This connection to our currently fruitful understanding of physics are what give the various hypotheses an initial plausibility. And it puts limits on how the universe could have happened – they don’t just “explain ANY possible state of affairs” in a universe. As I understand it the “good” multiverse theories can be tested against observations.
Vaal
Aaron, I accept your point that a quantum field at equilibrium and God are basically equivalent at this point in human history with our current knowledge of physics. But I disagree with your conclusion because there are troves of evidence for the quantum field (so much so that it is not a belief but a FACT) while there is zero evidence for God and only belief to support your statement. Belief is not factual. The quantum field is defined. God is not. While you can believe in a fact, it does not make that fact any more or less true.
You are not accepting my point. If a person wants to use physics terminology to refute physics, then they need to understand the terminology they are using or else stick to theism. Theism and metaphysics can’t refute physical laws because they provide no evidence just disbelief; and if a person doesn’t want to look at the evidence, well, “I do not know how to refute an incredulous stare”.
Your biggest mistake is that most physicists (I’m going to forgo an attempt to convince you that the theist/physicist hybrid exists in abundance) ARE NOT satisfied at the quantum vacuum. They study topics like String Theory. If String Theory accumulates enough evidence, then it will be considered factual and it will replace the current quantum field explanation. Your explanation will continue to be “God did it”. That’s why your argument fails, because it has no solid grounding. You can manipulate it as you see fit in order to counter whatever factual evidence is presented to you. And that’s fine, but when you try to claim that physical facts are not true based on that belief system, then it’s ludicrous to argue.
But I could omit all of my comment up to this point and simply defeat your argument by asking; what created God? Further more, What is “he” made out of? How does God have a gender? and so on. Physicists are always looking for an explanation of the limit. Why is the limit the limit and how is it the limit? Theists are doing the opposite. There is no convincing someone who opposes discovery. It’s like playing a game with a child. No matter what the rules are at any given point, the child will just change the rules accordingly in order to win the game. What has the child won? A false sense of superiority.
VAAL: “The justifications for the scientific method arise from the most fundamental epistemological problems for knowledge, for understanding reality as we are experiencing it. We experience an onslaught of impressions, but how do we attribute “causation” and “effect” and how can we go about understanding and predicting our experiences (i.e. how can we develop “explanations” for “how” something causes it’s effect). ”
Sure, to the extent what we experience reflects laws subject to confirmation through testing (to see if they can be falsified), science is the best way of establishing knowledge about that experience. The problem here is that you are dealing with areas where we have no direct experience, i.e, other universes beyond our own (in the case of the multiverse), or something beyond the boundary of t=0 (in the case of the issue of how the universe began to exist). What we have is indirect evidence to support different explanations. If none of those explanations are subject to empirical falsification, you are not dealing with physics, but metaphysics. Now I suppose you could argue that unless an explanation is empirically falsifiable it is not really an explanation. I would agree that it is not a “scientific” explanation–but I don’t see why it can’t qualify as a “more likely than not” explanation.
VAAL: “However, he and others in his field have explained that multiverse hypotheses derive from the very physics (including QM) used to explain and predict the way the universe seems to operate. Hence they are NOT in the category of “making up an entity that simply has the power to do X.” Rather, they explain HOW X could occur. This connection to our currently fruitful understanding of physics are what give the various hypotheses an initial plausibility. And it puts limits on how the universe could have happened – they don’t just “explain ANY possible state of affairs” in a universe. As I understand it the “good” multiverse theories can be tested against observations.”
If the multiverse can be tested against observations in the sense that Einstein’s theory was tested during the solar eclipse (when light was observed to bend–if it did not bend then the theory would have been falsified), then I would agree, it constitutes a scientific explanation. If not, though, it would seem to be a metaphysical explanation. Which is fine, but it is then in the same category as theism–you have competing metaphysical explanations. As with the A vs. the B-theory of time: both appear to be consistent with the scientific data, neither can be falsified scientifically, so they have to be argued for on metaphysical grounds.
Sean, thanks for the links to the debates.
For your information, the third video – Tim Maudlin’s “Cosmology, Theology, and Meaning” – appears to have been marked as private and is not available to view.
Vaal.
“Regarding falsifiability and the multiverse, I’m in no position to pontificate with technical detail about how exactly those hypotheses are vetted. Someone like Prof. Carroll is clearly in a better position to answer such questions. However, he and others in his field have explained that multiverse hypotheses derive from the very physics (including QM) used to explain and predict the way the universe seems to operate.”
It seems to me that this is nothing but a confirmation that the muliverse is not presently falsifiable, and an appeal to authority. The fact remains that though the multiverse constitutes a possible interpretation of the implications of some testable physics, it remains in evidential terms on a par with the idea of god. That some scientists find the idea plausible (some don’t) cannot be more than an appeal to authority until such a time as the idea can be rigorously tested. There is surely some hypocrisy in the fact that naturalists are so happy to entertain the hypothesis of the multiverse, and yet so stridently reject the hypothetical existence of god, often on the very basis that the idea is unfalsifiable. When we are not dealing with evidence, we are dealing with metaphysics and philosophy.
Theism vs Atheism debates are certainly interesting but unending! As a retired physics professor let me make a few points (Please see also my earlier comment in this blog.) As far as I can tell, in the scientific method, nothing has changed since the time of Galileo and Newton. You make observations with your sense organs (especially eyes with the help of aids like telescopes, microscopes etc.), make models to explain the data and predict the results of future experiments if possible. In this analysis you do not bring in concepts of divinity. Newton, even though a devout Christian, did not bring in concept of God in his Principia Mathematica while discussing planetary orbits. This method has been very fruitful over the centuries. Physics and cosmology have made strides in recent times. But the basics have remained same. The outcome is our scientific definition of reality. Already quantum mechanics and relativity are challenging our understanding of reality.
It is well known that we are on a measly planet orbiting an average star in an average galaxy in the boondocks of the universe which contains billions and billions of such systems. There could be multiple universes also. Human life on this planet evolved in a certain way resulting in a certain type of body and mind (intelligence, consciousness). For example our eyes are sensitive to only a narrow band of visible spectrum of electromagnetic waves. Elsewhere in the universe there could very well be superior bodies, intelligence and consciousness. While we can be proud of our achievement in whatever understanding of nature we have , it would be height of arrogance and stupidity if we insist that whatever we can understand with our sense organs and minds is all there is in the universe! Universe or multiverse is sufficiently complex. Let us be modest and accept that there could be aspects of reality we may not be able to understand. Now whether these ideas encourage you to believe in divinity or not, depends on your belief system. I do not think there is anyway of convincing people within our logical system one way or the other. But as I said above, already quantum mechanics and relativity are hinting that the reality may be completely different from what we can picture with our narrow minds.
I’d have to agree, this was possibly the best religion vs science debate I’ve ever listened to. Sean, Richard Dawkins passed up an opportunity to say a dozen or so things that you got out there extremely well, and without making the issue into the sort of free-for-all that he usually does.
Ignorance will always be an element of intelligence. This is as true for someone who is ignorant of science as it is for someone who is willfully or otherwise, ignorant of the relevant bits of religion. Religion is there for a purpose. Science has almost nothing to say on issues of morality or even cultural norms of morality unless at least some sort of tradition is there. Lots of things get easier on a day-to-day basis if there is at least some sort of tradition in place. If it is not a very good or complete tradition, religious OCD types of all flavors will be there to make it do all sorts of strange things that were never intended; handling rattlesnakes, human sacrifice, and the like.
“Any religion that cannot withstand a collision with reality is not worth many regrets.” –Arthur C. Clarke
Augustine938:
Part of the disagreement between you and me (and Vaal, I presume) winds down to epistemology and ethics.
##You think one can obtain knowledge about the natural world in ways other than science—actually supernatural ways—and I deny that possibility and call what you thus obtain beliefs, not knowledge.
##You place the same weight on beliefs as on knowledge but I say your beliefs are biased, bribed by the benefits your religion promises you if you adhere to them, therefore you should suspect them yourself.
##In my spiritual world I do allow beliefs—where beliefs properly belong. But you seem to let your beliefs trespass where only knowledge should go.
##Where knowledge is lacking or unfeasible (yes, I do think that some knowledge is forever beyond us) I acquiesce to the possibility of forever not knowing; you, on the other hand, seem to abhor a knowlege vacuum, presuming that what you do not know you may supplement with wishfull beliefs.
As I said, epistemology coupled with ethics.
DEL
“You think one can obtain knowledge about the natural world in ways other than science—actually supernatural ways—and I deny that possibility and call what you thus obtain beliefs, not knowledge.”
The problem with that is that the assertion: “There are no ways to acquire knowledge about the physical world other than science” cannot be arrived at or validated by scientific means and must be by your definition belief and not knowledge. Your position is thus self-contradictory – if the proposition “There are no ways to acquire knowledge about the physical world other than science” cannot be established scientifically then either a) it is not representative of true knowledge of the physical world, or b) you would propose to establish by some means other than science that there are no means other than science to acquire knowledge about the physical world.
Anonymous @ Mar.4, 11:30 am:
You are right to say that the multiverse idea is unfalsifiable and therefore cannot make a strict scientific theory. Vaal was obviously too wishful on this point. But to say that this puts the multiverse idea on par with god is preposterous:
Whereas the multiverse conjecture is based mathematically on accepted physics extrapolated to where it may not be falsifiable, god is no physics at all. God is supposed to be metaphysical, isn’t he?
Whereas the multiverse conjecture must satisfy many stringent scientific criteria besides falsifiability, filtering out all but a few admissible versions, the god conjecture owes nothing to nobody—replace “God” by “the evil sorcerer Hoompah Baloompah” and you get just as valid an explanation.
Whereas the multiverse conjecture might have been accepted as an explanation for the universe before inflation if it were falsifiable, the god conjecture can explain nothing, because He can do anything: Why did the chicken cross the road? Because god had made him do it!
DEL: “Whereas the multiverse conjecture is based mathematically on accepted physics extrapolated to where it may not be falsifiable, god is no physics at all. God is supposed to be metaphysical, isn’t he?”
That’s the point, if the multiverse is non-falsifiable, it is metaphysical (even if it is “mathematical metaphysics”) since the sine qua non of science (of which physics is a subset) is falsifiability.
DEL: “Whereas the multiverse conjecture must satisfy many stringent scientific criteria besides falsifiability, filtering out all but a few admissible versions, the god conjecture owes nothing to nobody—replace “God” by “the evil sorcerer Hoompah Baloompah” and you get just as valid an explanation.”
That’s true, but the fine-tuning argument doesn’t attempt to establish God by itself–the conclusion of the argument is only that there was an intelligent designer of the universe who fine-tuned the constants and quantities in the initial conditions for intelligent life. The fine-tuning argument is usually part of a cumulative case of several arguments of which God’s existence is the overall conclusion.
tristan:
I never said, and I don’t believe, that my epistemology is a physical entity belonging to the natural world. When I wrote about my beliefs, that’s the kind of beliefs I meant. Therefore I see no contradiction. Note that I’ve never denied metaphysics, only mandated it is properly segregated from physics.
tristan eldritch and Augustine1938,
First, let’s remember my initial objection to the case being made by Jack Spell: that if he can not explain how this “ability of an eternal agent to freely cause a temporal beginning” would work, or at the very least give some plausible examples for why we should think this power exists, then he is simply playing the “magic” card. The first point being that it’s illegitimate to infer the cause of the universe “must have been an agent endowed with free will” when, playing by the same non-rules, I can posit all manner of alternate causes with such power…so long as I too don’t have to explain how it would actually work. So this inference to a personal free willed cause is just special pleading.
Agree? If not, why not?
As far as I can tell you seem to be implicitly agreeing, or at least skipping over this, if only to move on to the charge “Ok, but even if his case suffers this weakness, scientists proposing multiverse hypotheses are guilty of the same thing.”
But that’s not the case. I’ve already pointed to the differences. The “free willed being caused the universe” hypothesis offers no understanding of “how” it would actually work. Whereas multiverse theories are all about “how it would work.” They are all about the rigorous detail in that respect. Further, they are also plausible. That is: the “how it would work” description is rigorously derived via mathematical logic, from the very maths models and observations that already seem to map to the reality we know (e.g. quantum mechanics). Even IF we currently don’t know which, if any, multiverse theory is correct, they at least get off the ground as : explanatory (how it would work) and plausible (derived as implications from the physics we HAVE tested).
The theory that an eternal, non-material being exists, let alone that it has the power to exist this way and cause temporal events like our universe offers NO such rigorous details of “how it would work,” no such rigorous attachment to the facts of our world, no plausibility given whatsoever.
And since good multiverse theories derive from the physics we know, they place strict limitations on what can happen under those theories: limitations on what we should find about the world. They are in principle falsifiable in that, should we discover some aspect of physics or some phenemonon that contradict the physics used in the multiverse model, that model won’t work. Whereas, as Prof. Carroll says, the theistic “God Did It” explanation seems to be infinitely flexible. WHATEVER way the universe is, WHATEVER new physics or phenomona we discover tomorrow can simply be explained by “God Wanted It That Way.” Because there is no mechanism proposed – just God’s “omnipotent ability to do whatever He wants” (the explanation so ill-defined in this way) that lets us understand the limitations involved, what would falsify it, or what it truly might predict.
Further, Prof. Carroll points out in his debate that there are multiverse theories that DO make predictions. Go to 57:40 of the debate where Carroll explains this and shows the type of slides making these predictions, that you will find in cosmologist conferences.
(And note that Einstein’s initial attempt to
posit a multiverse theory, the oscillating universe, was eventually thrown out, falsified, because it was a hypothesis that was rigorous enough in detail – was “defined” enough – to be shown in error by later calculations and observations. You don’t get this with Gawd-Did-It explanations)
Vaal
Another quote most applicable to the recent ‘debate’ with WCL:
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his livelihood depends on him not understanding it.” — Upton Sinclair
These debates would become more interesting if the loser forfeited his share of the proceeds, preferably to the charity of the winner’s choice.