The Moral Equivalent of the Parallel Postulate

(Update: further discussion here and here.)

Sam Harris gave a TED talk, in which he claims that science can tell us what to value, or how to be moral. Unfortunately I completely disagree with his major point. (Via Jerry Coyne and 3 Quarks Daily.)

He starts by admitting that most people are skeptical that science can lead us to certain values; science can tell us what is, but not what ought to be. There is a old saying, going back to David Hume, that you can’t derive ought from is. And Hume was right! You can’t derive ought from is. Yet people insist on trying.

Harris uses an ancient strategy to slip morality into what starts out as description. He says:

Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of conscious creatures… If we’re more concerned about our fellow primates than we are about insects, as indeed we are, it’s because we think they are exposed to a greater range of potential happiness and suffering. The crucial thing to notice here is that this is a factual claim.

Let’s grant the factual nature of the claim that primates are exposed to a greater range of happiness and suffering than insects or rocks. So what? That doesn’t mean we should care about their suffering or happiness; it doesn’t imply anything at all about morality, how we ought to feel, or how to draw the line between right and wrong.

Morality and science operate in very different ways. In science, our judgments are ultimately grounded in data; when it comes to values we have no such recourse. If I believe in the Big Bang model and you believe in the Steady State cosmology, I can point to the successful predictions of the cosmic background radiation, light element nucleosynthesis, evolution of large-scale structure, and so on. Eventually you would either agree or be relegated to crackpot status. But what if I believe that the highest moral good is to be found in the autonomy of the individual, while you believe that the highest good is to maximize the utility of some societal group? What are the data we can point to in order to adjudicate this disagreement? We might use empirical means to measure whether one preference or the other leads to systems that give people more successful lives on some particular scale — but that’s presuming the answer, not deriving it. Who decides what is a successful life? It’s ultimately a personal choice, not an objective truth to be found simply by looking closely at the world. How are we to balance individual rights against the collective good? You can do all the experiments you like and never find an answer to that question.

Harris is doing exactly what Hume warned against, in a move that is at least as old as Plato: he’s noticing that most people are, as a matter of empirical fact, more concerned about the fate of primates than the fate of insects, and taking that as evidence that we ought to be more concerned about them; that it is morally correct to have those feelings. But that’s a non sequitur. After all, not everyone is all that concerned about the happiness and suffering of primates, or even of other human beings; some people take pleasure in torturing them. And even if they didn’t, again, so what? We are simply stating facts about how human beings feel, from which we have no warrant whatsoever to conclude things about how they should feel.

Attempts to derive ought from is are like attempts to reach an odd number by adding together even numbers. If someone claims that they’ve done it, you don’t have to check their math; you know that they’ve made a mistake. Or, to choose a different mathematical analogy, any particular judgment about right and wrong is like Euclid’s parallel postulate in geometry; there is not a unique choice that is compatible with the other axioms, and different choices could in principle give different interesting moral philosophies.

A big part of the temptation to insist that moral judgments are objectively true is that we would like to have justification for arguing against what we see as moral outrages when they occur. But there’s no reason why we can’t be judgmental and firm in our personal convictions, even if we are honest that those convictions don’t have the same status as objective laws of nature. In the real world, when we disagree with someone else’s moral judgments, we try to persuade them to see things our way; if that fails, we may (as a society) resort to more dramatic measures like throwing them in jail. But our ability to persuade others that they are being immoral is completely unaffected — and indeed, may even be hindered — by pretending that our version of morality is objectively true. In the end, we will always be appealing to their own moral senses, which may or may not coincide with ours.

The unfortunate part of this is that Harris says a lot of true and interesting things, and threatens to undermine the power of his argument by insisting on the objectivity of moral judgments. There are not objective moral truths (where “objective” means “existing independently of human invention”), but there are real human beings with complex sets of preferences. What we call “morality” is an outgrowth of the interplay of those preferences with the world around us, and in particular with other human beings. The project of moral philosophy is to make sense of our preferences, to try to make them logically consistent, to reconcile them with the preferences of others and the realities of our environments, and to discover how to fulfill them most efficiently. Science can be extremely helpful, even crucial, in that task. We live in a universe governed by natural laws, and it makes all the sense in the world to think that a clear understanding of those laws will be useful in helping us live our lives — for example, when it comes to abortion or gay marriage. When Harris talks about how people can reach different states of happiness, or how societies can become more successful, the relevance of science to these goals is absolutely real and worth stressing.

Which is why it’s a shame to get the whole thing off on the wrong foot by insisting that values are simply a particular version of empirical facts. When people share values, facts can be very helpful to them in advancing their goals. But when they don’t share values, there’s no way to show that one of the parties is “objectively wrong.” And when you start thinking that there is, a whole set of dangerous mistakes begins to threaten. It’s okay to admit that values can’t be derived from facts — science is great, but it’s not the only thing in the world.

180 Comments

180 thoughts on “The Moral Equivalent of the Parallel Postulate”

  1. If you can’t derive “ought” from “is”, well, what can you derive it from? “Is” is all there is 🙂

    (And the argument that you can’t derive “ought” from anything is trivially uninteresting. You might as well refuse to breathe on the basis that air can’t be proven to exist.)

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  3. The intellectual deep end? Pretending that objective judgments cannot be made on religious cultural traditions that demean, degrade insult, injure and kill ? How is that enlightened? Harris is judged as wanting intellectually because he makes the point that we *can* make judgment calls on the actions of others? These insults are based on what? The idea that moral relativism is some kind of law, and that since morals can be relativistic, it’s impossible to objectively analyze the outcome of a particular world view and decide whether it is beneficial (or not) to the well being of human beings?

    This is cowardice. I don’t give a damn how sincere someone is in a belief. If that belief causes definable, predictable cultural and personal harm, we indeed can judge that belief as negative and state with conviction that such a belief is detrimental and yes, “wrong”.

  4. I left this comment on Sam Harris’s post. I figured that this is a decent place to put it too.

    Hi Sam,

    I think there is substance to what you are saying but sentences like “My claim is that there are right and wrong answers to moral questions, just as there are right and wrong answers to questions of physics, and such answers may one day fall within reach of the maturing sciences of mind”, are easy to refute as Sean Carroll does pretty well in his blog at:
    http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/03/24/the-moral-equivalent-of-the-parallel-postulate/

    I think your the more important and relatively bulletproof point is that science can help us reason significantly better about moral issues, since people have a much more complex bag of values that are often in conflict and pointing out contradictions between their values etc. might get them to rethink their values and change them.

    For example, the extent to which different animals suffer might change what people consider moral PROVIDED they consider other people’s suffering to be bad. Likewise, convincing people that there is little or no evidence for the existence of a God, might prompt people to downweight treating their holy book as the ultimate source of values and rethink a lot of issues. A scientific analysis of the holes in the “Beethoven argument” against abortion might reduce many people’s opposition to abortion.

    So at the end of the day, what science can do is tell us the implications of many different acts with a high degree of accuracy. People can then decide if the implications of the act in question, the opportunity cost of not having the implications of alternative acts etc. makes sense to them.

    It is however not hard to see that one can always have a whacky set of terminal values with very few additional values which would be conflicted by the implications of the aforesaid values. It therefore seems almost absurd to hear you (Sam) claim that there exists a set of moral laws similar to the laws of physics and that science can help us find it.

    We are increasingly realizing that humans are not in principle different from computers. So is it somehow immoral to break a computer or kill a process running on my computer? Stating that there exist ultimate moral laws is almost equivalent to saying that there are ultimate moral laws regarding how we should treat computers and how computers should treat one another.

    So I think the important point here is that science has a great deal to say about factual claims, which includes the implications of different actions which are considered moral/immoral. These can be extremely helpful when two people are discussing their conflicting morals or if a person is re-evaluating their morals. If a person considered A to be immoral but were shown evidence that A causes B where B is a desirable outcome to him, he might re-evaluate his stance towards A. Likewise if a person considers A to be moral and C to be immoral, and were shown evidence that A->B and C->D where he considers D to be a significantly better outcome than B, that might cause him to re-evaluate his relative moral stance towards A and B.

    Vijay

  5. Although I agree that Sam’s argument hasn’t been completely fleshed out, I think his basic idea that morality can be given an objective basis has some merit. People seem to be stuck on the notion that “ought” is some transcendent concept, when in reality it’s just a word to describe the relation of goal-seeking machines to their goals. As a matter of fact, there are certain things we strive to achieve, such as happiness, comfort, love, etc. Asking whether it’s “right” to have these things is like asking a roomba if it’s “right” for the room to be clean. Answering the question of what is right (in the lofty philosophical sense alluded to in phrases like “ought from is”) first requires us to define what “right” means, and I don’t think it’s possible to do this in a non-circular way.

  6. Morgan-LynnGriggs Lamberth

    Of course, Sam is right as the objectivity isi n the consequesnces of actons on people, other animals and the environment.As with science, that is provisional and debatable; it is also contextual.That is for normal people!
    Please study Beversluis’s comments on what I call wide-reflective subjectivism that I find paradoxically underpins objective morality in ‘C.S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religiion.” Now, I find ,with Quentin Smith, there are more common decencies that make for the universal morality I call coventnat morality for humanity- the presumption of humanism.

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  8. I was expecting to see something controversial from Harris here, but I don’t see it. I agree with His Shadow above. What’s wrong about it? Is it that you guys disagreeing are moral relativists? Harris’ speech was mostly against moral relativism, but also careful not to fall into absolutism, which seems about right. He clearly is not advocating either that science can uncover all moral truths that easily, only that there are certain moral extremes that should be clear given what we know about the world. As someone else (and probably others) said above, what is does affect what ought.

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  10. I find myself, at least on a theoretical basis, falling on the side of saying “what is ought anyway”. Can this, at root, be anything more than a preference? Where do preferences come from? My answer would be: The physical reality of our bodies and their evolutionary and development history. Sounds to me like the “ought” is actually a complicated set “Is” questions. I really like how Brendan J. Brewer put it above.

    However, I question the practicality of the overwhelming approach that Sam is advocating, and see all sorts of danger therein.

    I have not yet watched the Ted video posted above, but have heard an earlier talk from Sam Harris on the same subject and found myself nodding along in the first half of his talk where he describes the concept of deriving “objective” moralities, but then being horrified in the second half of his talk with his examples of the no brainer “everyone would agree with this” axioms of objective morality, which have struck me mostly as a list of his personal cultural hang ups with Islam. Some of which are no doubt valid, but what shocked me is the complete lack of any sort of rigor or scientific approach to coming up with those examples of “universal agreement”. This made the first bit of that talk seem nothing other than window dressing.

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  12. @Sean comment 9, @Adam Solomon comment 39:

    I agree with Adam that Sean’s argument for claiming that ethics can not be compared to math is invalid. However, I would like to put forward two arguments why math can not be compared to ethics:

    1. To do math and ethics one has to make assumptions. But for math, we can test the outcome of the exercise *without* using the assumptions that we used to derive the outcome. For example, in Euclidean Geometry we can derive the long side of a triangle using math, and test it using a ruler. But how can we measure morality without making prior assumptions on what morality is?

    2. Mathematical axioms are compatible with each other, otherwise the system is not sound. However, in ethics the starting axioms are already incompatible with each other. Take for example the principles of individual freedom and collective happiness.

  13. I watched the video of Sam Harris and I could not help noticing the 2 pictures of the Women in the Burkas and the young women on the Magazine covers … and I think it is a provable fact that some of those women in the burkas are looking just like the magazine ladies (under their burkas) and some are not. Not everyone wants the same thing – your right may be my wrong …

    For me: I experience the same wonderment for river rock as I do for insects and primates … now dealing with them is another story… with that we are on our own.

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  15. Morgan-LynnGriggs Lamberth

    Folks, study Michael Shermers’s ” The Science of Good and Evil” and Paul Kurtz’s ” Foribdden Fruit.”
    Covenant morality is universal as opposed to egoism. Quentin Smith has an exceellent book on religion and morality. Note : he knows physics like Sean M. Carroll.
    Ah, have a go @ Objectivism!It is actually part of this and part of that, and Rand used her intutions rather than emprical analysis.
    We ever refine our innate moral sense- empathy-to extend to others, and Kurtz us all to have a planetary ethic.
    Note what Beversluis maintains about subjectivism in both forms, and he notes that with someone like Lord Russell, even simple subjectivism works.
    We can come to agreement.

  16. I read so much fear here– fear that the status quo is changing. So much so that some of the comments are obvious ad hominims stating that Harris is ignorant, and somehow implying that because he is not famous enough, we should not listen to him. Has ‘no academic credentials whatsoever’? That’s simply laughable.

    Perhaps everyone needs to take a deep breath and relax a moment. The knee jerk reactions seen here show the insecurity and concern that the paradigm might change. That’s what happens in our world– change. People like this blogger and followers (yes, he has them and knows this 🙂 are focused very intently on Harris. Look at the number of comments. Perhaps they see him as having influence, because a part of what he says makes sense and they must defend, defend, defend…

    It interests me that people are filling in gaps and creating a Harris who advocates a new world order. Some here have actually suggested this; or that he wishes to expunge spirituality. I have read his books, his critics as well; and I’ve listened to his lectures whenever I discovered them. I have known of him for several years now, and, well, beyond all the big words and the ethical questions called up here, it seems rather simple to me:

    To me, Harris does not speak about nature as separate from humans…. we are part of nature and therefore the rules of science that we happily apply to the world around us, apply to us as well. I can accept that and enjoy the ride.

    To me, Harris believes that there are reasons, biological and neurological reasons, why all species do what they do. We are a species. He simply wants to uncover the reasons why we do what we do. Why are so many of you afraid to explore? Or, do you really think that we have reached the apex of human understanding about ourselves?

    To me, Harris envisions a world in which we can CONTINUE to define human suffering and, therefore, continue to reduce it. We’ve done it for a long time; Harris is not really new to this. Why are so many afraid to refine this understanding, just as we have eagerly refined our understanding of technology? It’s funny. Already the human species accepts the science that helps us to understand why hunger causes suffering. And we work to reduce that suffering as a society in many places in the world. Reducing suffering? I’m interested in checking that out.

    To me, Harris is advocating the exploration of scientific understanding so that we can better understand ourselves and improve our lives.

    I’m not really sure what the big problem is…

  17. Wow, he’s like a un-funny Ben Stiller.

    Talk about simplifying things.

    I like how he argues there exists a knowable “Moral landscape” function, yet he then states that we will never be able to go to a supercomputer and find a clear answer or optimal solution.

    So, we just need to “think carefully on our own” about our choices and actions and how we feel about things or women and how they dress. Wow, deep.

    “Perhaps we can just find a nice place in the middle”…aa how nice and cute.

    And if it upsets us should we do something about it? Maybe go to war?

    You gonna sign up for the Marines go fight for what you believe?

    What is the optimal moral function for war? How many lives does it cost for removing Burkas from “suffering” Middle eastern women?

    It’s called the rule of law and civilization. And that stuff changes all the darn time.

    What blatant arrogance.

    Don’t tell me how I should feel, pal!

    Cuz’ you don’t know sh*t! 😉

  18. Even baboons are peaceful when they don’t have to fight for a mate and hunt for food.

    The simple fact is without the normal facade of stability and societal construction people are capable of “vwery baaad things”

    “The Horror, The Horror!”

    Would Mr. Harris kill others to uphold his world view? Or to survive?
    Would he die for it?

    Would you join a gang to feed your family or yourself?

  19. Hume’s ought/is argument was aimed at the theory of Natural Law, which basically holds that what is is right, because God made the world. It was never intended to invalidate moral intuitions and feelings–without these, there would be no discussions of morality, because we wouldn’t even have a concept of morality. Removing human emotions from the picture not only makes the discussion of ethics impossible, it makes it entirely pointless. This is like insisting that all discussions of physics avoid mention of matter, energy, and mathematics. Harris is simply taking basic human universal needs, wants, and moral concerns as a given, and working from these facts. And yes, there are basic ethical concepts which are common to ALL cultures.

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