The best talk I heard at the International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Beijing was, somewhat to my surprise, the Presidential Address by Adolf Grünbaum. I wasn’t expecting much, as the genre of Presidential Addresses by Octogenarian Philosophers is not one noted for its moments of soaring rhetoric. I recognized Grünbaum’s name as a philosopher of science, but didn’t really know anything about his work. Had I known that he has recently been specializing in critiques of theism from a scientific viewpoint (with titles like “The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology“), I might have been more optimistic.
Grünbaum addressed a famous and simple question: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” He called it the Primordial Existential Question, or PEQ for short. (Philosophers are up there with NASA officials when it comes to a weakness for acronyms.) Stated in that form, the question can be traced at least back to Leibniz in his 1697 essay “On the Ultimate Origin of Things,” although it’s been recently championed by Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne.
The correct answer to this question is stated right off the bat in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Well, why not?” But we have to dress it up to make it a bit more philosophical. First, we would only even consider this an interesting question if there were some reasonable argument in favor of nothingness over existence. As Grünbaum traces it out, Leibniz’s original claim was that nothingness was “spontaneous,” whereas an existing universe required a bit of work to achieve. Swinburne has sharpened this a bit, claiming that nothingness is uniquely “natural,” because it is necessarily simpler than any particular universe. Both of them use this sort of logic to undergird an argument for the existence of God: if nothingness is somehow more natural or likely than existence, and yet here we are, it must be because God willed it to be so.
I can’t do justice to Grünbaum’s takedown of this position, which was quite careful and well-informed. But the basic idea is straightforward enough. When we talk about things being “natural” or “spontaneous,” we do so on the basis of our experience in this world. This experience equips us with a certain notion of natural — theories are naturally if they are simple and not finely-tuned, configurations are natural if they aren’t inexplicably low-entropy.
But our experience with the world in which we actually live tells us nothing whatsoever about whether certain possible universes are “natural” or not. In particular, nothing in science, logic, or philosophy provides any evidence for the claim that simple universes are “preferred” (whatever that could possibly mean). We only have experience with one universe; there is no ensemble from which it is chosen, on which we could define a measure to quantify degrees of probability. Who is to say whether a universe described by the non-perturbative completion of superstring theory is likelier or less likely than, for example, a universe described by a Rule 110 cellular automaton?
It’s easy to get tricked into thinking that simplicity is somehow preferable. After all, Occam’s Razor exhorts us to stick to simple explanations. But that’s a way to compare different explanations that equivalently account for the same sets of facts; comparing different sets of possible underlying rules for the universe is a different kettle of fish entirely. And, to be honest, it’s true that most working physicists have a hope (or a prejudice) that the principles underlying our universe are in fact pretty simple. But that’s simply an expression of our selfish desire, not a philosophical precondition on the space of possible universes. When it comes to the actual universe, ultimately we’ll just have to take what we get.
Finally, we physicists sometimes muddy the waters by talking about “multiple universes” or “the multiverse.” These days, the vast majority of such mentions refer not to actual other universes, but to different parts of our universe, causally inaccessible from ours and perhaps governed by different low-energy laws of physics (but the same deep-down ones). In that case there may actually be an ensemble of local regions, and perhaps even some sensibly-defined measure on them. But they’re all part of one big happy universe. Comparing the single multiverse in which we live to a universe with completely different deep-down laws of physics, or with different values for such basic attributes as “existence,” is something on which string theory and cosmology are utterly silent.
Ultimately, the problem is that the question — “Why is there something rather than nothing?” — doesn’t make any sense. What kind of answer could possibly count as satisfying? What could a claim like “The most natural universe is one that doesn’t exist” possibly mean? As often happens, we are led astray by imagining that we can apply the kinds of language we use in talking about contingent pieces of the world around us to the universe as a whole. It makes sense to ask why this blog exists, rather than some other blog; but there is no external vantage point from which we can compare the relatively likelihood of different modes of existence for the universe.
So the universe exists, and we know of no good reason to be surprised by that fact. I will hereby admit that, when I was a kid (maybe about ten or twelve years old? don’t remember precisely) I actually used to worry about the Primordial Existential Question. That was when I had first started reading about physics and cosmology, and knew enough about the Big Bang to contemplate how amazing it was that we knew anything about the early universe. But then I would eventually hit upon the question of “What if they universe didn’t exist at all?”, and I would get legitimately frightened. (Some kids are scared by clowns, some by existential questions.) So in one sense, my entire career as a physical cosmologist has just been one giant defense mechanism.
Garth,
I think you misunderstand “reductio ad absurdum”. If we have a logical proof that something cannot come from nothing, then for sure it would be the case of
“reductio ad absurdum”. But we do not have that (yet, at least).
It is not “reductio ad absurdum” just because you find the conclusion unbelievable.
Prove that something cannot come from nothing. Then I’ll certainly agree with you that this is “reductio ad absurdum”.
Existence of something simply needs to be “established” or initialized since otherwise we have the case of: “It exists because it exists”.
We only need to realize that since reality is self consistent, then “it exists because it exists” is not how reality “works”. Reality is not reliant upon circular logic. Then reality would not be self consistent, it would conflict with itself, and therefore it would not exist.
This is actually “reductio ad absurdum”. Assuming that something exist because it exists, shows it cannot exist. This demonstrates that “it exists because it exists” is invalid (of course).
There are of cause other ways of showing that eternal existence is illogical. See earlier arguments.
Carl
Carl,
I was not saying your argument was a “reductio ad absurdum” argument, but that the logicality of an argument does not guarantee the soundness of its conclusion, as in the case of “reductio ad absurdum”.
Eternal existence is not necessarily a case of saying “It exists because it exists”.
Those holding to such a view such as Tegmark in his statement
would say there is no need for the “because”, they would believe that the existence of something like mathematics does not need an explanation. Of course that statement cannot be proven, just taken on faith, exactly as with your statement “Something, whose existence has not been established, simply does not exist.”
Garth
Just to make it clear; in a “reductio ad absurdum” argument you start with a premise A and develop logically to a conclusion B, which is recognised as absurd, because, for example, it is a logical contradiction.
It is therefore concluded that the original premise A was false.
I am using the example of this form of argument to show that the logical soundness of an argument does not guarantee the correctness of the statement B, I am not criticising the final conclusion “therefore premise A is false”, which is, of course, correct.
Garth
Garth,
I can’t make the link to the paper work it seems.
But that the world (or reality) is “mathematical” is no surprise. We know of no other way reality can be self-consistent (and not too simple) without “using” math.
That the physical laws “looks like” math is natural (in my view).
But anyway we should also keep in mind that reality is one thing, a self-consistent description of reality is another thing (although there must be a one-to-one “mapping” between them. Sometimes it seems to get blurred whether people are thinking about reality or its description.
But, based on your quote, I don’t think Tegmark has given much thought about how the existence of logic and math has come about.
Of course also logic comes from nothing. It is only self-contradictory “things” that cannot come from nothing! And they can’t have eternal existence either.
🙂
Carl,
Try http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.4024 the original link was copied from the abstract and worked initially but not now!
I understand what Tegmark is saying but I would not necessarily agree with him. I agree that the basis of physical nature, the structure of quarks, strings etc. is mathematical in nature, but to say that they are mathematical would be to make a category mistake to my way of thinking.
I would say there are two uses of the word ‘eternal’.
The first is a temporal meaning as might be applied to the universe in the Steady State Theory, which means that the universe would go on forever over all time without beginning or end. Time itself would not have a beginning or end.
The second is a non-temporal meaning, outside time, so that something exists whether time passes or not.
I would say that the mental constructs that are mathematics and logic exist eternally in the non-temporal sense, outside space and time. Just as we would not say that an idea such as Pythagorus’ theorem exists only at a certain location(s) so I would add it does not exist only for a certain time.
But then again others may well think I am being Platonic.
Garth
Garth,
Thanks, I already found it. Maybe Tegmark is right, that reality is just math. And its description is the same. I have speculated in similar lines. It more or less follows from the requirement that reality must be perfectly self consistent. There is (maybe) the possibility that “something” else also might do that trick. But we don’t know what that is. Whether its some more “physical stuff” or something more “abstract”. But Tegmark makes a lot of sense, actually.
But clearly Tegmark thinks that math is eternal (big mistake 🙂 ). So if we apply the same arguments as before we see it cannot be eternal. Math can’t generate its own existence etc. etc. Like anything that exists, even math can’t be used to explain its existence (the circular logic and all that).
The only logical “point of departure” for explaining the existence of math (or reality) is still nothing.
There is no Phythagorus theorem “before” something exists. It needs to come from nothing. But that is no problem. 🙂
Carl
So, the solution is: Nothing really exists, were “really” refers to a form of existence that is more real than in an abstract mathematical sense.
If I buy a computer programme I might receive a CD, a floppy disk, a tape, sheets of paper with lines and lines of code on it, or download it straight from the internet. What therefore is the programme? Obviously not the medium: the CD, floppy, tape, or paper sheets but the intellectual property of the abstract ideas that are the set of instructions that make up the programme.
To think that the CD is the programme is to make a category mistake. To my way of thinking Tegmark is making the same sort of category mistake.
If we work out the ‘Theory of Everything’ as a physical theory written in the language of mathematics we would have before us a sheath of paper on which are written equations, a set of mathematical, abstract, mental constructs’ not a new universe; hence Stephen Hawking’s question quoted above: “What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe?”
I cannot but understand mathematical truths as eternal truths that exist ‘outside space and time’ and distinct from the physical world which may indeed have had a beginning in time, but not necessarily so.
How do we define “exists”?
Garth
Garth, maybe you worry too much about what exists (and its meaning?), instead of: why existence instead of nothing? Which is really the issue here.
Intellectual “things” clearly depend on existence of “computers” (human or otherwise) which in turn depends on the existence of “something” like a universe which in turn has been “created from” nothing.
After reading some of Tegmark, it strikes me that Gødels incompleteness theorem corresponds to the fact that we cannot use anything existing to explain existence. Big surprise 🙂
—
Nothing really exists
How do we define “exists”?
—
🙂 Language can play us some tricks unless we are careful..
“Something is said to exist if it is not nothing”. Nothing is “void” of any thinkable (and unthinkable) concepts. Except for what exists, there is simply nothing.
Carl
I still like to think that 2 + 2 = 4 even if there are no human minds around to think so.
Garth
Garth,
I was talking rubbish, 2+2 does not depend on humans, only on existence. Being necessarily self consistent, probably only mathematical universes are possible..
So 2+2= 4 is true “as long as” something exists.
Carl
Wow, you guys are still going at it here (if there really “is” a “here” … ;-).
Garth: Although you are very sturdy to keep putting up with CarlN (please don’t be offended Carl, you are just very trying), you don’t get Tegmark’s point. No, he isn’t confusing the CD with the program, he is saying there is only the program. That means, there’s no logically clear definition of “substance.” – consider, a “description” in the Platonic realm of all possible descriptions, specifying where everything is and what it does in our universe (not really possible anyway because what do you do with the wave functions, especially when they “collapse”?) But pretend that’s not a problem. Tegmark is saying, that is all this universe (and all the others) is. He would say, what distinguishes a “real CD” from the set of points describing one in mathematical space.
But, I don’t agree with him. Our talk about “really existing stuff” is indeed mystical, but that’s because existence really is mystical – it really can’t be logically framed. Also, if we were just math, we couldn’t really feel nausea, joy, itches, experience the true qualitative experience of red, green, etc.- He just doesn’t get it. His “world” is a pathetic, hollow, geek fantasy of the most pitiful sort. I’m not too hard on him and other modal realists because there is no *logical* way to make the point that matter is something more real than math, but they just aren’t right that logic is enough to describe everything.
Neil,
Thank you, I did understand what Tegmark was saying and like you I disagree with it!
The CD example was just a trivial illustration of what I meant by a “category mistake”. A better illustration is that of the difference between a “Theory of Everything” and the actual universe, which exists, that such a theory describes.
There I’ve done it again – used that mystical word ‘exists’!
Garth
Neil, Garth,
You are probably just math. Nausea? Joy? That’s just what math can do. Somehow you think your feelings and perceptions are not part of the “physical” (or mathematical) universe. (without any reason for thinking so?). Your feelings ultimately are produced by the same “laws” that governs everything else. Like it or not.
Existence is not mystical. Well, it used to be 😉 . It can be logically framed. If it couldn’t, there would be no existence.
Everything needs to be logically simple and self-consistent otherwise it can’t exist.
Seems you guys need another reality.
Carl
No, Carl, we are not just pure math. First, “time” isn’t even mathematically describable. Really, despite all the hype about 4-D space and etc., and the equations like dp/dt = …. etc., those are just using t as a marker for different kinds of mathematical relations. They don’t really specify the difference between space and time as genuine duration the way that point specifications do indeed specify a “space” distribution. Some scientists just pretend that “time” is “an illusion”, just like they deny the genuine, qualitative nature of conscious experience. Being “qualitative” is by nature not part of mathematical description. Nor can the wave function be rationally described by mathematics (how would the “collapse” rule apply given simultaneity differences?), nor can true randomness (mathematical “machinery” can only generate pseudorandom numbers, such as from the digits of pi etc.)
The claim that things need to be logically framable is not only an unfounded conceit, but provably false as I just explained. No, it isn’t those of us who appreciate that who need “another reality” – we’ve already got this one, which is quite “mystically” non-mathematical – but those who believe that everything is mathematics. Maybe you can find such a pure math universe and live there, but there would no time and no conscious experience – just a bunch of dead points and structures in various “spaces.” It wouldn’t be very fun.
Why not? can you prove that no formally describable robot can say that he is qualitative about something?
There is no evidence that time evolution is not unitary, i.e. that the wavefunction really collapses instead of the observer entering into a superposition of the different possible experimental outcomes.
Nevertheless, the mathematical Neil B when eating the mathemical dinner contaminated with mathematical salmonella would still become ill and say to the mathematical doctor that he feels very sick. 🙂
Well this is a rehtorical question that shall not be part of a scientific discussion. I have dealt with this issue in detail in my book ‘Philosophy and Science of Nature’ (
Well this is a rehtorical question that shall not be part of a scientific discussion. I have dealt with this issue in detail in my book ‘Philosophy and Science of Nature’ (www.newphysicsworld.com) though without referring to it directly.
Nothingness, when taken literally, rules out a physical reality. However, in this question nothingness is more akin to the concept of zero in the mathematics and thus assumes the status of a physical reality.
I just stumbled upon this discussion and found some reall interesting comments and hence felt that a discussion on the above line may be more fruitful.
Nice blog and very interesting comments. Best of luck.
Neil,
When I said the universe is probably mathematical, it’s based on the mathematical structure of the physical laws and the self consistency of reality. So there is good reason to believe that, but it is no evidence of course. You, on the other hand, seems to offer nothing else than your unfounded(?) personal view or “feelings” in rejecting this.
So what do you conclude from that?
You are offering the term “qualitative” (your own quotes) without explaining what qualitative means. I know what it means and what you try to say (I think) but I fail to see the relevance. I’m not saying you could not be right, but I can’t see how you can be sure about this. If you could prove it it would be big news, I think.
Regarding time I also think there is something wrong with it, the way it is used in physics today. You say it can’t be described mathematically, that I don’t understand. Personally I think Leibnitz was basically right. Time is “generated” by motion or change. I think it should be like this:
Forces (bosons)–>change–>time
There is no time in a universe where nothing (careful with that word!) moves. So time is generated when things are forced to move. If the laws of physics could be recast to reflect this, some additional insights might be found. But maybe not.
It might be completely equivalent.
I can’t see where you demonstrated that things need not to be logically framable. If you did, that is very significant too.
Regarding the collapse of the wavefunction I take no responsibility! Well, I could also discuss that with you, but shouldn’t we discuss why something instead of nothing? Or is everybody happy now with my explanation? 🙂
Carl
Iblis/CarlN: Sure, mathematical beings would say the same things real feeling beings do, but that’s just behavioristic escapism. (I don’t think you really are a “feigner of anesthesia”, but if you were: would you let me torment you to show your stoic faith in the sterile structuralism of the world? Nor does it matter a hoot whether a robot could talk about qualitative or anything else for that matter, of course it could form the words – so what? You could also make a formal robot and its environment that just came into existence, that talked about the “past” as if real, and no observable difference at the present time (analogous to Russell’s skeptical question – but here, we actually make it so!)
Qualitative is like the experience difference between red and green (not to be confused with the actual light wavelengths, but the effect on you of signals from the different types of cones in your retina.) “Qualitative” means there is no structure defining the difference, but differs in an irreducible way about its identity. Either you get it/admit it or not, I only have so much time and effort to waste on anyone who doesn’t try hard enough to appreciate those sort of fundamentals of our real lives.
Sunil: Sure, this isn’t “science”, it’s philosophy – so? That’s what philosophy is all about. Why not tell the scientists to quit doing philosophy, instead of philosophers to quite doing “science” which they aren’t doing anyway in a case like this?
“It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.”
-Wittgenstein
Also, CarlN: You say time can be defined by “movement” but that is a circular definition, since “movement” means change with respect to time. Time cannot be defined by anything more primitive, it cannot be defined by reference to dimensional structure which are defined collections of points and have no time or motion unless time is already a given to begin with. I challenge you or anyone to define time in a non-circular way and in a way distinct from “configuration.”
BTW The issue of the wave function may be relevant, so, what do you think of it? (See my blog for a good paradox…)
Neil, so if 30 years from now you could replace your neurons one by one by transistors in such a way that your brain would remain functionally the same, thereby becoming immortal, you won’t do it?
I think that it is very difficult to deny that were are anything else than computer programs. What we experience is just a simulated world by the programs our brains are running, which is, of course, modelled after the “real world” using the information that we get from our senses.
In that world things like green and red objectively exist. But the way I perceive green may be slightly different from the way you perceive it, because you are in a different universe than I am (your program is different from mine, so you live in a different virtual world than I do).
Neil,
Regarding time: The only way to measure it is to compare some motion/change against some reference motion/change (like the rotation of Earth). So time depends on change, not the other way around.
Classically: dx/dt = p. If we choose to regard p as more fundamental than t then we “generate” time dt = dx/p. Or use a wavefunction ø:
dø/dt = Hø (H a time-independent Hamiltonian). So “formally” dt = dø/(Hø).
Don’t take this literally, I’m just trying to make a point. Time is not “fundamental” in that we can choose what we regard as fundamental (p or t).
Time needs two things:
1. It needs the existence of some “objects” (minimum 2). More if time is also to be “observed”).
2. It needs for these objects to change or move relative to each other
Without this there is no time.
——-
Qualitative is like the experience difference between red and green (not to be confused with the actual light wavelengths, but the effect on you of signals from the different types of cones in your retina.) “Qualitative” means there is no structure defining the difference, but differs in an irreducible way about its identity. Either you get it/admit it or not, I only have so much time and effort to waste on anyone who doesn’t try hard enough to appreciate those sort of fundamentals of our real lives.
————
Yes, I simply do not get this. Either I’m stupid, or this is nonsense.
After a quick look at your blog, it was not easy to see what you’re trying to say.
It could take some time digest. A figure or two would help a lot.
Carl
“Qualitative” and the experience difference between red and green, and nausea… Can these “exist” in Tegmark’s Mathematical Object Multiverse?
The word and concept from Philosophy applicable is:
Qualia.
As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins:
First published Wed Aug 20, 1997; substantive revision Tue Jul 31, 2007
Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem.
The entry that follows is divided into eight sections. The first distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and introspection, representational theories of qualia, and finally the issue of qualia and simple minds.
* 1. Other Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’
* 2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia?
* 3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities?
* 4. Functionalism and Qualia
* 5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap
* 6. Qualia and Introspection
* 7. Representational Theories of Qualia
* 8. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?
* Bibliography
* Other Internet Resources
* Related Entries
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