The best talk I heard at the International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Beijing was, somewhat to my surprise, the Presidential Address by Adolf Grünbaum. I wasn’t expecting much, as the genre of Presidential Addresses by Octogenarian Philosophers is not one noted for its moments of soaring rhetoric. I recognized Grünbaum’s name as a philosopher of science, but didn’t really know anything about his work. Had I known that he has recently been specializing in critiques of theism from a scientific viewpoint (with titles like “The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology“), I might have been more optimistic.
Grünbaum addressed a famous and simple question: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” He called it the Primordial Existential Question, or PEQ for short. (Philosophers are up there with NASA officials when it comes to a weakness for acronyms.) Stated in that form, the question can be traced at least back to Leibniz in his 1697 essay “On the Ultimate Origin of Things,” although it’s been recently championed by Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne.
The correct answer to this question is stated right off the bat in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Well, why not?” But we have to dress it up to make it a bit more philosophical. First, we would only even consider this an interesting question if there were some reasonable argument in favor of nothingness over existence. As Grünbaum traces it out, Leibniz’s original claim was that nothingness was “spontaneous,” whereas an existing universe required a bit of work to achieve. Swinburne has sharpened this a bit, claiming that nothingness is uniquely “natural,” because it is necessarily simpler than any particular universe. Both of them use this sort of logic to undergird an argument for the existence of God: if nothingness is somehow more natural or likely than existence, and yet here we are, it must be because God willed it to be so.
I can’t do justice to Grünbaum’s takedown of this position, which was quite careful and well-informed. But the basic idea is straightforward enough. When we talk about things being “natural” or “spontaneous,” we do so on the basis of our experience in this world. This experience equips us with a certain notion of natural — theories are naturally if they are simple and not finely-tuned, configurations are natural if they aren’t inexplicably low-entropy.
But our experience with the world in which we actually live tells us nothing whatsoever about whether certain possible universes are “natural” or not. In particular, nothing in science, logic, or philosophy provides any evidence for the claim that simple universes are “preferred” (whatever that could possibly mean). We only have experience with one universe; there is no ensemble from which it is chosen, on which we could define a measure to quantify degrees of probability. Who is to say whether a universe described by the non-perturbative completion of superstring theory is likelier or less likely than, for example, a universe described by a Rule 110 cellular automaton?
It’s easy to get tricked into thinking that simplicity is somehow preferable. After all, Occam’s Razor exhorts us to stick to simple explanations. But that’s a way to compare different explanations that equivalently account for the same sets of facts; comparing different sets of possible underlying rules for the universe is a different kettle of fish entirely. And, to be honest, it’s true that most working physicists have a hope (or a prejudice) that the principles underlying our universe are in fact pretty simple. But that’s simply an expression of our selfish desire, not a philosophical precondition on the space of possible universes. When it comes to the actual universe, ultimately we’ll just have to take what we get.
Finally, we physicists sometimes muddy the waters by talking about “multiple universes” or “the multiverse.” These days, the vast majority of such mentions refer not to actual other universes, but to different parts of our universe, causally inaccessible from ours and perhaps governed by different low-energy laws of physics (but the same deep-down ones). In that case there may actually be an ensemble of local regions, and perhaps even some sensibly-defined measure on them. But they’re all part of one big happy universe. Comparing the single multiverse in which we live to a universe with completely different deep-down laws of physics, or with different values for such basic attributes as “existence,” is something on which string theory and cosmology are utterly silent.
Ultimately, the problem is that the question — “Why is there something rather than nothing?” — doesn’t make any sense. What kind of answer could possibly count as satisfying? What could a claim like “The most natural universe is one that doesn’t exist” possibly mean? As often happens, we are led astray by imagining that we can apply the kinds of language we use in talking about contingent pieces of the world around us to the universe as a whole. It makes sense to ask why this blog exists, rather than some other blog; but there is no external vantage point from which we can compare the relatively likelihood of different modes of existence for the universe.
So the universe exists, and we know of no good reason to be surprised by that fact. I will hereby admit that, when I was a kid (maybe about ten or twelve years old? don’t remember precisely) I actually used to worry about the Primordial Existential Question. That was when I had first started reading about physics and cosmology, and knew enough about the Big Bang to contemplate how amazing it was that we knew anything about the early universe. But then I would eventually hit upon the question of “What if they universe didn’t exist at all?”, and I would get legitimately frightened. (Some kids are scared by clowns, some by existential questions.) So in one sense, my entire career as a physical cosmologist has just been one giant defense mechanism.
Folks:
It is better not to think in terms of “nothingness” as the alternative to there being something. Take the statement, “Santa Claus does not exist.” We are not supposed to think of “exist” as a property (like fat, wearing a red suit etc.) of someone who “exists,” but that there is not a Santa Claus. If “nothing existed”, that is supposed to mean, no existing entities could be listed in a true statement, not that a “nothingness” would be around instead. Modal Realists aren’t confused about the point made about Santa Claus thing, rather: they challenge the idea of “existing” as being able to refer to “stuffs” that embody some structural descriptions and not others – that not only is there no reason to justify why some descriptions would be “incarnated” and not others, but the difference can’t even be explained and isn’t real anyway. In other words, that there is only structure, no substrate. “Go figure” heh.
But even without going into that deep end, we still have problems of what exists in physical context (like I said about fields versus the direct observables), whether the wave function is something “real” that leaves an atom and then collapses everywhere else when detected etc. (BTW, I do not buy decoherence as a dodge, how could it even explain the simple collapse for one photon when it is geared to interference of many waves? Also, it utilizes as explanation (the irreversible coupling) something that wouldn’t necessarily happen unless waves did collapse in the first place, can’t deal with Renninger negative result experiments (says Penrose and I see the point) etc.
The ‘something’, which we are made of, cannot answer this question until we fully understand ‘nothing’.
In the meantime, the leading expert of this question is Bush#2, as he turns something into nothing, based on nothing appearing as something.
This ties into the deep issue of “Imaginary Logic” in the sense developed in Russia, and less known (except via Spencer-Brown and Kauffman in the Anglo-American world). Is there ontological validity to worlds with not merely different physical laws, but different Logic?
The solipsist and co-solipsist or antisolipsist (you exist, I don’t) differ in the zeroth order in whether or not they assert their own existence, but agree at the first order, and hence the antisolipsist agrees with the solipsist. In the solipsist’s model, there is only one being, and so for the solipsist to agree with the antisolipsist ismodeled by the solipsist as his agreeing with himself.
The solipsist insists that the symmetry mapping the
solipsist to the anisolpisist and vice versa is a
trivial symmetry, having one element.
What A in universe A believes in Logic A about B in
universe B with Logic B can be consistently modeled by a C in universe C with Logic C, using the proper
construction of “imaginary logic” – which generalizes Kripke using Model Theory.
This is relevant in the context of you assigning zero
probability to the existence of someone who might very well assign the same probability to you.
Don Quixote met someone who claimed to be Cervantes. Robert Heinlein, in the under-rated The Number of the Beast (6^(6^6)) has a bar at which different versions of the protagonist argue with each other.
Borges, in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” points out the
dangers of mapping what you a priori believe to be the nonexistent, when the level of existence is subject to on-the-fly revision.
This all cries out for n-categorization, as does the
theory of recursive narrative. One can, for inistance,
have a twisted structure of mutually referential
narratives…
Certain ur-stories are the fixed points of
story-transformations. Myths may be chaotic attractors in the space of iteratively mapped narratives. Greg Egan and Ursula K Le Guin emphasize the dynamic role of the narrator. The roll of adding machine paper of the original manuscript of “On the Road” [published 50 years ago] becomes a Mobius strip in “Finnegan’s Wake.” This, of course, makes Greg Egan’s existence suspect, since his last
name is the last 4 letters of “Finnegan.”
OK – you can always retreat into operationalism if you like it.
OK – you can always retreat into operationalism if you like it. It doesn’t however answer the question why is the Universe we live in so finely tuned for life?. Or put another way, why is the fine structure constant 1/137 not 1 or 10^6 ore even 10^-6 and many similar questions.
Currently there seems to be only two possible answers to these questions, either they were selected from an ensemble of Universes by the anthropic principle or they were set by God. Yer pays yer money and yer makes yer choice 🙂
Well, if any universe might be finely tuned for some type of life, is it surprising that one is?
Or, if we look at some type of life that does exist, do we need to find some way to force the universe into a justification of that particular life, or do we instead look at the universe and see that this particular life, perhaps, incidentally came about from it?
In some ways this reminds me of the problems facing science as it studies the human mind, e.g., can the mind gain the necessary abstraction from itself to make objective conclusions?
From a practical sense, as for the “nothing” — perhaps there is, or was, or will be. But “something” is what we have mostly in our faces all the time, most likely.
I’m curious what role our notions of Time might play in this.
See if you can think of any form of life that can exist in a Universe with alpha=1.
Very slightly off topic: every time I hear the expression “fine tuning” used to refer to the supposition that life as we know it depends upon natural constants having very specific values I’m moved to remind everybody that speaking about fine tuning is cheating. We might possibly come to know that the relevant values do have to be thus and so, but that is very far from establishing that the values are the result of a choice. That would be a second and far more difficult leap. So far as I know, nobody has ever suggested a physical or, for that matter, metaphysical means by which constants could be set, but this fine tuning language suggests that there is nothing problematic about the image of God fiddling with the dials of his Creat-o-matic 77. Just how does a Creat-o-matic work?
To be fair, I’m a humorless character and also wonder to whom or what God was giving permission when he said “Let there be light.”
Why is existence the universe?
Excellent post! Thank you for clearing up those muddy waters where a lot of nonsense speculation is sold as proper philosophical inquiry. My position is the same as yours on the matter, something I’ve come to think after having considered the implications of positivism, phenomenology and various other philosophical movements. I even recall having similar thoughts as as you Sean as a kid. Those thoughts found a void to roam when I discovered science fiction at the age of ten and I’ve been a skeptic with a love for science ever since.
“What really interests me is whether God had any choice in the creation of the world.” – Einstein I guess is asking the same question.
So the universe exists, and we know of no good reason to be surprised by that fact.
The universe exists and we are not surprised.
The universe exists and we are surprised.
The universe does not exist and we are surprised.
The universe does not exist and we are not surprised.
Each is a Zen Koan.
Sorry Jakob, Sean did not clear up anything, although I understand the difficulty of getting a handle on this question.
I can’t do justice to Grünbaum’s takedown of this position, which was quite careful and well-informed. But the basic idea is straightforward enough. When we talk about things being “natural” or “spontaneous,” we do so on the basis of our experience in this world. This experience equips us with a certain notion of natural — theories are naturally if they are simple and not finely-tuned, configurations are natural if they aren’t inexplicably low-entropy.
No, we don’t have to talk about what’s logically natural, which is not the same as “natural” qua Nature, on the basis of our experience in this world. We can think abstractly, including at the highest levels, about that issue and others. Otherwise, we couldn’t think about infinite sets, all the Aleph and omega categories and orders of cardinal and ordinal infinity. It is really silly in my opinion to just take this particular way of things for granted, and pretend we can’t make a logical critique of why it should be here, or the way it is, etc. The most basic point: an abstract distinction like “existing” just cannot be connected to a particular way for a universe to be. For this world to be natural to “exist,” and not other kinds we can imagine, is like the number 23 just being embodied as brass numerals somewhere, not any other numbers. You folks are trying to avoid the high-level abstract thinking that is the cream of philosophy.
In the interest of humbleness, and perhaps a fitting close to this discussion (of course, anyone is welcome to pitch in), I say: None of us can really “clear up” the question “Why is there something rather than nothing” (except maybe to say, a better formed question is just “Why is there something?) It is the primal mystery …
“Why is there something rather than nothing?” As it happens I think I found the answer not so long ago. And it’s rather simple.
Consider first the two possible situations:
1. There is nothing
2. There is something
We know that situation 2 corresponds to reality, but what determines that there is something rather than nothing?. Well, it goes without saying that the factor that “decides” existence of something cannot involve anything existing (not without using circular logic at least..).
So the “deciding” factor must be nothing. Everthing that exist (universe(s)) must have been created from nothing.
Now, how is this possible? Easy:
1. When there is nothing, there are no hinders for something to be created from nothing.
The proof is obvious.
2. When there is nothing there are no conditions that need to be fullfilled (f . ex. conservation laws) for somthing to be created from nothing.
Again the proof is obvious.
So there is an answer to the question of course.
There are a lot of other interesting logical conclusions that can be drawn from this as well. Maybe later..
Keep in mind: Except for what exists there is nothing.
Sorry about the English.
🙂
If there are no conditions to be fulfilled, i.e. no conservation laws etc., then why was an ordered universe complete with propitious laws “created from nothing” ?
Perhaps the proof is not so easy?
Garth
Garth,
The conservation laws of this universe has nothing(!) to do with the lack of conservation laws “in” nothing.
Our universe is one of an infinite number of universes created from nothing. All with random properties since there are no rules for the creation. Ours just happened to end up with properties so that humans could exist (and arue about these things).
For the obvious proofs: We reach a contradiction by supposing there exists conditions (rules, conservation laws etc.) “in” nothing.
Carl
CarlN:
Sorry, but Nothing (not a “-ness” but it being the case that no thing of any kind exists…) has to stay Nothing. You said:
1. When there is nothing, there are no hinders for something to be created from nothing.
That reminds me of Isaac Asimov’s “Four-leaf clover” idea of positive and negative matter and antimatter. However, if there’s “nothing” then there is no time and therefore that situation, however you imagine it, must stay that way. Think: How could for example there be a chance, like for radioactive decay, for our universe to emerge “from nothing” unless there was a process already there to mark time? You can try to “cheat” (as I see it) by imagining the time as part of a bubble that’s just self-contained, but that still doesn’t answet the points listed below.
It is ironic that despite the appeal of traditional materialism and uncaused matter to many scientists and philosophers:
1. The very idea of substantive versus logical-description “existing” is questionable.
2. Aside from whether you accept #1, for this particular world to have special existential status is an irrational loose end. Then you have a mad-house, untamed omni-multiverse or “management” to keep order somehow.
Seems we cannot answer WHY
or WHEN or WHERE or WHAT
except of a Universe of something (inside of nothing?)
But tell me Sean, since there is something (at least the ‘evidence’ around us would have us believe that there is and that we are) does that mean there can never be ‘nothing’ – there will always be something.
Neil B,
Sorry, but Nothing is always Nothing despite how many things that comes from nothing. Apart from what exists there is “still” nothing. No matter how many “things” are created from nothing.
But of course there is no time in nothing. Nothing can’t “feel” when something breaks away from nothing. “Seen” from nothing nothing ever happens.
Anyway, there is only one way of giving a logical answer to existence. And that is that all is created from nothing.
Remember, “Nothing comes from nothing” is a statement that never has been proven. In fact, it is impossible to prove it. Because it is false.
—
1. The very idea of substantive versus logical-description “existing” is questionable.
—
What is this? Is seems you are actively seeking irrationality. There are logicial answers to all reasonable questions. Whether you like it or not.
—
2. Aside from whether you accept #1, for this particular world to have special existential status is an irrational loose end. Then you have a mad-house, untamed omni-multiverse or “management” to keep order somehow.
—
I can’t see any logical way you can reach these conclusions. Please show how you do this.
Let me just add: There is only one logical way of explaining the “fine-tuned” properties of our universe. And that is that there are an infinite number of universes.
And it is possible to prove that an infinite number of universes are created “all the time” from nothing. It can be proven that these are all independent and can’t
“feel” each others existence. So it’s like there is only one universe.
The first fact of a quantity deemed “nothing”, is itself a immpossibility notion. One cannot get nothing, from something? Can one reduce something down to a degree of zero, I think not.
You can always get something out of “nothing”, because nothing does not actually equate to anything, there will always be a finite remnant “something” left.
The physical notion of the term nothing, is a human concept based on a discriptive value that is not quite true.
Paul,
I can’t imagine how you think about nothing. Very strange..
Nothing is what’s left when you exclude everything that exists. Nothing is simpler than nothing. Nothing is actually the only concept that does not require an explanation.
Everything else requires an explanation, but “Nothing” does not.
And “Nothing” is the only way to explain existence without circular logic. Any other attempt will fail.
I don’t see the logic when you require that it should be possible to reduce something to nothing. Why on earth should that be possible?
Regards,
Carl
I like the perfectly ambiguous, “Nothing is impossible”.
Sean,
Maybe I should have addressed this first:
—-
Ultimately, the problem is that the question — “Why is there something rather than nothing?” — doesn’t make any sense. What kind of answer could possibly count as satisfying?
—-
Well, I saw some other comments that also held that this question is not meaningless.
It actually requires a leap of faith to declare a straightforward question as meaningless. Unless you can offer some proof that it is meaningless of course.
Maybe this also indicates that you will choose to view any answer to the question as “unsatisfying”. Maybe even if you can’t prove such an answer as wrong?
Carl
Crap, I was working on an essay on just this subject, and it sounds like Grünbaum’s already taken all the fun out of it by making all of the same points that intrigued me.
CarlN: did you somehow miss all the points about why the question is meaningless? It’s because such questions are category errors: they apply concepts and terminology derived from a particular context TO that context. How can anyone possibly go about answering a question about what is likely for possible universes when they only have the one example to work with?
The universe exists, instead of not existing. If you think that reality is surprising, then YOU need to explain why it is.