The best talk I heard at the International Congress of Logic Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Beijing was, somewhat to my surprise, the Presidential Address by Adolf Grünbaum. I wasn’t expecting much, as the genre of Presidential Addresses by Octogenarian Philosophers is not one noted for its moments of soaring rhetoric. I recognized Grünbaum’s name as a philosopher of science, but didn’t really know anything about his work. Had I known that he has recently been specializing in critiques of theism from a scientific viewpoint (with titles like “The Poverty of Theistic Cosmology“), I might have been more optimistic.
Grünbaum addressed a famous and simple question: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” He called it the Primordial Existential Question, or PEQ for short. (Philosophers are up there with NASA officials when it comes to a weakness for acronyms.) Stated in that form, the question can be traced at least back to Leibniz in his 1697 essay “On the Ultimate Origin of Things,” although it’s been recently championed by Oxford philosopher Richard Swinburne.
The correct answer to this question is stated right off the bat in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Well, why not?” But we have to dress it up to make it a bit more philosophical. First, we would only even consider this an interesting question if there were some reasonable argument in favor of nothingness over existence. As Grünbaum traces it out, Leibniz’s original claim was that nothingness was “spontaneous,” whereas an existing universe required a bit of work to achieve. Swinburne has sharpened this a bit, claiming that nothingness is uniquely “natural,” because it is necessarily simpler than any particular universe. Both of them use this sort of logic to undergird an argument for the existence of God: if nothingness is somehow more natural or likely than existence, and yet here we are, it must be because God willed it to be so.
I can’t do justice to Grünbaum’s takedown of this position, which was quite careful and well-informed. But the basic idea is straightforward enough. When we talk about things being “natural” or “spontaneous,” we do so on the basis of our experience in this world. This experience equips us with a certain notion of natural — theories are naturally if they are simple and not finely-tuned, configurations are natural if they aren’t inexplicably low-entropy.
But our experience with the world in which we actually live tells us nothing whatsoever about whether certain possible universes are “natural” or not. In particular, nothing in science, logic, or philosophy provides any evidence for the claim that simple universes are “preferred” (whatever that could possibly mean). We only have experience with one universe; there is no ensemble from which it is chosen, on which we could define a measure to quantify degrees of probability. Who is to say whether a universe described by the non-perturbative completion of superstring theory is likelier or less likely than, for example, a universe described by a Rule 110 cellular automaton?
It’s easy to get tricked into thinking that simplicity is somehow preferable. After all, Occam’s Razor exhorts us to stick to simple explanations. But that’s a way to compare different explanations that equivalently account for the same sets of facts; comparing different sets of possible underlying rules for the universe is a different kettle of fish entirely. And, to be honest, it’s true that most working physicists have a hope (or a prejudice) that the principles underlying our universe are in fact pretty simple. But that’s simply an expression of our selfish desire, not a philosophical precondition on the space of possible universes. When it comes to the actual universe, ultimately we’ll just have to take what we get.
Finally, we physicists sometimes muddy the waters by talking about “multiple universes” or “the multiverse.” These days, the vast majority of such mentions refer not to actual other universes, but to different parts of our universe, causally inaccessible from ours and perhaps governed by different low-energy laws of physics (but the same deep-down ones). In that case there may actually be an ensemble of local regions, and perhaps even some sensibly-defined measure on them. But they’re all part of one big happy universe. Comparing the single multiverse in which we live to a universe with completely different deep-down laws of physics, or with different values for such basic attributes as “existence,” is something on which string theory and cosmology are utterly silent.
Ultimately, the problem is that the question — “Why is there something rather than nothing?” — doesn’t make any sense. What kind of answer could possibly count as satisfying? What could a claim like “The most natural universe is one that doesn’t exist” possibly mean? As often happens, we are led astray by imagining that we can apply the kinds of language we use in talking about contingent pieces of the world around us to the universe as a whole. It makes sense to ask why this blog exists, rather than some other blog; but there is no external vantage point from which we can compare the relatively likelihood of different modes of existence for the universe.
So the universe exists, and we know of no good reason to be surprised by that fact. I will hereby admit that, when I was a kid (maybe about ten or twelve years old? don’t remember precisely) I actually used to worry about the Primordial Existential Question. That was when I had first started reading about physics and cosmology, and knew enough about the Big Bang to contemplate how amazing it was that we knew anything about the early universe. But then I would eventually hit upon the question of “What if they universe didn’t exist at all?”, and I would get legitimately frightened. (Some kids are scared by clowns, some by existential questions.) So in one sense, my entire career as a physical cosmologist has just been one giant defense mechanism.
Hey Ross, there is a simple explanation “where did the first thing come from”.
“When” there is nothing there are no conditions that need to be fulfilled for something to be created from nothing. There are no need for causes for something to be created from nothing.
Proof: “When” nothings exists there exists no conditions (like conservation laws) since there is simply nothing.
“When” nothing exists there exist no need for causes for something to start to exist. When nothing exists there exists also no need for causes.
Only nothing is needed for something to start to exist. So it is not strange at all that something actually do exist.
Try this one on for size to answer the Central Leibniz Question:
Brian Miller Ph.D.
The Set {Something, Nothing} is not exhaustive. Space (volume in three or more dimensions) is a third member of the Set. Space combines characteristics of somethingness and nothingness,and may exist ad infinitum without predeterminates or cause.
In a universe being created, the creation of mass and the creation of space appear together as canonical variates. Space and matter also disappear together when you run the movie backwards – as in the Big Crunch. Since other physical properties such as charge can sum to zero with, eg. positron colliding with electron, isn’t it possible that some quanta of space may be the anti-particle of mass, viz. SPACE = – MASS/ENERGY. Space can be present ad infinitum without predeterminates or cause. The presence of space may occur cannonically with the creation of mass/energy; under certain conditions – possibly the Big Crunch- space and mass can also annihilate one and other into nothingness. Conversely, nothingness could just as likely be nothingness within a three (or higher) dimensional volume, ie, Space, which would impel the creation of mass/energy – the latter, acting as the anti-particle to space, would maintain the Conservation of Nothingness.
I am only a humble artist, and i offer this: eternity is not a long, long, long time. It is a completely different idea. Time is a limited idea, eternity is an unlimited idea.
I only perceive time if I believe in cause and effect as separate, cause preceding effect. What if they are the same thing? Then time is no longer necessary. I imagine there are billions of universes that don’t bother with time.
Why is there Something rather than Nothing? Perhaps reality solved that problem by applying Occam’s Razor and being both Something AND Nothing.
Where is the Nothing? It’s here, just not observable. Never will be . . .
My conclusion, for peace of mind, is that all the comments to this post are true.
To quote Walt Whitman:
“Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)”
Reality contains ALL possibilities, even untrue ones. Don’t worry about it. The purpose of existence is to have fun.
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The question is not worded correctly. Beginning the question with “Why…” automatically assumes a purpose or reason for existence, and leaves it in the arena of philosophers and theologians. Shouldn’t it be re-stated as “How is it that there is anything at all?” This change in terminology makes it a question that science can grapple with.
Qualium, comment #228, hits the nail on the head. Something and nothing are two aspects of a binary opposition. Each aspect defines, contradicts, and confirms the other.
You know, like a photon is a wave and a particle, its binary opposite, at the same time although both cannot be observed simultaneously as Heisenberg showed with the thought experiment that led to his Nobel Prize.
It was Heisenberg’s mentor, Niels Bohr, who observed that — while wave-particle descriptions of a single photon were inconsistent and incompatible [and contrary to Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction] — both were necessary for a complete description of nature.
If you are interested, there’s more on this at http://donnee.com.
Absolute nothingness is impossible. Why?
Just as yourself the following question with respect to absolute nothingness. Is it true that absolute nothingness obtains? If it is not true, then absolute nothingness does not obtain, and therefore there is something rather than nothing. But if it is true, then there is truth, and hence a way things are, and thus some kind of reality, i.e. something, even if it is totally barren of physical or concrete objects. Hence, contra the initial supposition, absolute nothingness is impossible, i.e absolute nothingness could not obtain. That’s why there is (necessarily) something rather than nothing.
Carl
It is like the chicken or the egg, who came first. The reason for existence, is because without it, there could not be nothing. You must have to have not.
something rather than nothing huh..
chk out my views here..
http://neozubair.wordpress.com/2009/07/28/nothingness/
The egg came first. A genetically modern chicken hatched from an egg. Its parents were the common ancestors of the modern chicken.
Carl stated that eternity cannot exist because our universe has an apparent beginning. In this case, our universe must one day cease to exist. We are then left with two avenues to contemplate.
1. Before and after the existence of the known universe, there is nothing.
2. The known universe has indeed a cause for existence, and comes from another, possibly larger universe.
If this larger universe has no beginning, It could be described as eternal. In an eternal universe, there is no longer a such thing as pure “nothing”.
While the existence of a megaverse is not yet verifiable, It illustrates we have the ability to come up with a solution to the big “something vs. nothing” question. Unfortunately, it’s not good enough to be a full fledged “answer”. Existential questions persist in a megaverse too.
Luckily, this idea is compatible with M theory (brane theory), so there are scientists looking for evidence for this.
Semantically, the concept ‘is not’ has no ‘definite description’ or presentation. The universe just ‘is’ universe of contingent ‘things’, beings which ‘are’ have the copula ‘is’. The apophantic. Being is euuated with ‘is’. This in no way elucidates the ‘fact’ of existence. It’s brute ‘thatness’ Reason are called for. the theistic are rejected for requiring their equally implausible, counter-factual, improbable suppositions. We are left with the question. Why is there something rather than nothing.
Language attempts two answers: 1. non-existence is meaningless. it has no definite description or referent. It i not presentable. It fall’s outside the scopes of experience and language. Talk about the universe not existing is therefore literally meaningless. (constructive metaphysical non-sense) In so far as this is supposedly an abstract, extreme example
Alternatively, terms like ‘nothingness’ and some thing ness’ are infra-referential, pointing to an immanent and not transcendetal constituting of language. Language constitutes the world but doesn’t do so prohibitively. It cannot do so without the concept of nothingness.
The approach ( not solution) is to distinguish metaphysics, ontology, logic and the philosophy of language. ‘Why is there something rather than nothing is a profound existential and ontological question precisely because the emphasis and status is on the status of the question before it is on the status of the answer
Why is there something rather than nothing…
Semantically, the concept ‘is not’ has no ‘definite description’ or presentation. The universe just ‘is’ universe of contingent ‘things’, beings which ‘are’ have the copula ‘is’. and are ‘explained through their antecedent ’causes” The apophantic. Being is equated with ‘is’.
This in no way elucidates the ‘fact’ /nature of existence. It’s brute ‘thatness’,
Reason are called for. the theistic are rejected for requiring their equally implausible, counter-factual, improbable suppositions. We are left with the question. Why is there something rather than nothing.
Language attempts two answers: 1. non-existence is meaningless. it has no definite description or referent. It i not presentable. It fall’s outside the scopes of experience and language. Talk about the universe not existing is therefore literally meaningless. (constructive metaphysical non-sense) In so far as this is supposedly an abstract, extreme example
Alternatively, terms like ‘nothingness’ and some thing ness’ are infra-referential, pointing to an immanent and not transcendetal constituting of language. Language constitutes the world but doesn’t do so prohibitively. It cannot do so without the concept of nothingness.
The approach ( not solution) is to distinguish metaphysics, ontology, logic and the philosophy of language. ‘Why is there something rather than nothing is a profound existential and ontological question precisely because the emphasis and status is on the status of the question before it is on the status of the answer
Imagine there is only one thing in the universe and it expands to fill infinity. Now, ask yourself: how is that any different than an infinite amount of nothing?
Is it possible that an infinite amount of anything, even nothing, could cause existence itself?
I don’t think we’re going to ever know the answer to these questions, so I suggest we focus on things we CAN understand.
My head feels like it’s going to explode. I’ve been contemplating about this brute fact since age 12, and I don’t think I’m getting any closer to the answer, I feel pessimistic about the chance of we ever coming up with the right answer!
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